Artem Dinaburg, Author at Security Boulevard

64 Bits ought to be enough for anybody!

| | Research Practice
How quickly can we use brute force to guess a 64-bit number? The short answer is, it all depends on what resources are available. So we’re going to examine this problem starting with the most naive approach and then expand to other techniques involving parallelization. We’ll discuss parallelization at the ... Read More

TSC Frequency For All: Better Profiling and Benchmarking

Have you ever tried using LLVM’s X-Ray profiling tools to make some flame graphs, but gotten obscure errors like: ==65892==Unable to determine CPU frequency for TSC accounting. ==65892==Unable to determine CPU frequency. Or worse, have you profiled every function in an application, only to find the sum of all function ... Read More
Fuzzing In The Year 2000

Fuzzing In The Year 2000

| | Uncategorized
It is time for the second installment of our efforts to reproduce original fuzzing research on modern systems. If you haven’t yet, please read the first part. This time we tackle fuzzing on Windows by reproducing the results of “An Empirical Study of the Robustness of Windows NT Applications Using ... Read More

Fuzzing Like It’s 1989

| | fuzzing
With 2019 a day away, let’s reflect on the past to see how we can improve. Yes, let’s take a long look back 30 years and reflect on the original fuzzing paper, An Empirical Study of the Reliability of UNIX Utilities, and its 1995 follow-up, Fuzz Revisited, by Barton P ... Read More
Binary view of the sum_of_squares function

Protecting Software Against Exploitation with DARPA’s CFAR

Today, we’re going to talk about a hard problem that we are working on as part of DARPA’s Cyber Fault-Tolerant Attack Recovery (CFAR) program: automatically protecting software from 0-day exploits, memory corruption, and many currently undiscovered bugs. You might be thinking: “Why bother? Can’t I just compile my code with ... Read More
Figure 1: How branch misprediction leads to speculative execution. When the branch predictor makes an incorrect guess about the destination of a conditional branch, some instructions are speculatively executed. The execution of these instructions is undone, but their effects on the cache remain. Spectre causes the branch predictor to guess wrong and speculatively execute a carefully chosen set of instructions.

An accessible overview of Meltdown and Spectre, Part 2

This is the second half of our blog post on the Meltdown an Spectre vulnerabilities, describing Spectre Variant 1 (V1) and Spectre Variant 2 (V2). If you have not done so already, please review the first blog post for an accessible review of computer architecture fundamentals. This blog post will ... Read More