Escape from the Maze – Part 2

In the last article, we have covered the obfuscation techniques used by one of the loaders used by the Maze ransomware. It is recommended to read it before you start with the Maze DLL.

In this article we will analyze in detail the obfuscation techniques used by the Maze DLL. Additionally, a series of scripts will be provided to deobfuscate and better follow the execution flow.

Usually the ransomware Maze is in DLL form, which is loaded into memory through a loader containing the encrypted DLL.

Therefore, there are two components:

  • Loader/packer that contains the Maze encrypted DLL and performs a series of checks before launching the ransomware component, which we discussed in our last article.
  • Maze (DLL), which is highly obfuscated and performs a series of checks before running that will be explained throughout this article.

You can find the samples used for this article in the IOC section.


  • Some samples of Maze (in the DLL itself) have been found making use of the same control flow flattening technique that we found in the loader/packer explained in the last article.

Maze DLL

Obfuscation techniques

The Maze DLL presents the following obfuscation techniques:

  • Hidden API calls with opaque predicates
  • Hidden return with push + JMPs eax (WinApi)
  • Hidden memcpy calls
  • Fake calls
  • Opaque predicates with intermediate jumps and junk code

Below, we will detail how these techniques work and how they can be patched.

Hidden API calls with opaque predicates

The real API calls in the Maze DLL are hidden behind opaque predicates and work as follows:

There are two conditional jz and jnz jumps pointing to the same address 0x100371A2. Before executing the jmp to the address where the code will execute jmp <WindowsAPIAddr>, a push operation will push the return address, in this case 0x10001571.

This address will be the one the program will return to once the Windows API function is executed.

It is important to note that, in this case, the opaque predicate is pointing to a part of the Maze code that contains several jmp instructions, each pointing to a function of the Windows API.

This hides the Windows API calls by putting an intermediate step via jmp instructions, making it more difficult to follow the program execution flow.

OpaquePredicate jz/jnz -> jmp WinAPIFuncAddr ->  Execute WinAPIFunc -> return to pushed address

In this case, once the return address has been pushed push offset loc_10001571 , it will jump to the jmp lstrlenA.

68 71 15 00 10           push    offset loc_10001571 <- Push return Addr loc_10001571
0F 84 57 5C 03 00        jz      loc_100371A2        <- if jz jmp to JMP FuncWinAPI
0F 85 51 5C 03 00        jnz     loc_100371A2        <- if jnz jmp to JMP FuncWinAPI
FF 25 9C 90 03 10        jmp     ds:lstrlenA         <- Jump here and lstrlenA
40                       inc     eax                 <- Then return here (pushed value)
89 E3                    mov     ebx, esp
50                       push    eax
55                       push    ebp
53                       push    ebx
68 94 15 00 10           push    offset dword_10001594
0F 84 CE 5E 03 00        jz      sub_10037450
0F 85 C8 5E 03 00        jnz     sub_10037450
AE                       scasb

Now that it is understood how it works, let’s eliminate the opaque predicates.

To remove the conditional jumps, all opaque predicates of this type must be detected.

For this purpose the following expression will be used:

68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ??

This expression, along with some script checks, will find opaque predicates, but we need to differentiate those that make jmp to the Windows API from those that do not:

  • If the opaque predicate jumps to an address that does not point to a jmp to Windows API function, it will be changed to an unconditional jmp.
  • In the case of those conditional jumps that point to a jmp to an Windows API function, they will be patched by replacing the opaque predicate with the call push ret formula.

Thus it is necessary to check if the address being pointed to starts with:

FF 25

For example, this is a case where there are calls to the Windows API:

Because loc_10371A2 points to jmp lstrlenA:

Once patched, it presents the Windows API call correctly and the return has been fixed:

Now the program flow is much easier to follow.

During the patch, an extra byte was used for retn because the code that precedes this type of call is junk code. If there was a problem with this, it could always be fixed as there are 4 bytes with previous NOP that can be used for patching. -> obfuscated_jz_jnz()

Hidden return with push + JMPs eax (WinApi)

Similar to the previous case, and to further complicate the tracking of the program flow, push and jmp instructions are combined to simulate a call behavior. The code will jump to the address of a register, and will return to the address pushed to the stack.

push addr_1 -> jmp WindowsApiFunc -> Execute WindowsApiFunc -> return to addr_1



push 0x100028C9 -> jmp lstrcatW -> Execute lstrcatW -> return to 0x100028C9

Usually it is not possible to determine that EAX contains an address of a Windows API without first observing it during the dynamic analysis, but in the analyzed samples the behavior is always the same, so it can be patched as explained below.

Note that in certain cases a fake API call can be found after the call to jmp eax. For example, in the image above the call LsaAddAccountRigts is junk code since that code fragment will never be executed.

In order to patch it up, we first have to identify all the calls of this type. We can use the following expression:

68 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF E0

Which is based on the following code fragment:

.text:100028B8 68 C9 28 00 10                 push    offset loc_100028C9
.text:100028BD FF E0                          jmp     eax
.text:100028BF FF 15 08 90 03 10              call    ds:LsaAddAccountRights

After checking that the block is correct, it is necessary to change the jmp for a call instruction that will call the Windows API that is passed to EAX, then put the push after the call and add a ret so that the code jumps to the memory address that has been passed in the push instruction:

.text:100028B8 FF D0                          call    eax ; lstrcatW
.text:100028BA 68 C9 28 00 10                 push    100028C9h
.text:100028BF C3                             retn
.text:100028C0 90                             nop
.text:100028C1 90                             nop
.text:100028C2 90                             nop
.text:100028C3 90                             nop
.text:100028C4 90                             nop

In the case where a fake call instruction is found after jmp eax, it can be patched with nop instructions.

The final code is much cleaner:

Moreover, during the analysis, the execution will be easier to follow. -> patch_jmp_eax()

Hidden memcpy

There is a particular function that is called repeatedly during the execution of Maze.

This function will be called up continuously throughout the execution of the program and may complicate the analysis if its purpose is not understood.

The function will be identified with its start:

.text:10037450 57                                      push    edi
.text:10037451 56                                      push    esi
.text:10037452 8B 74 24 10                             mov     esi, [esp+8+arg_4]
.text:10037456 8B 4C 24 14                             mov     ecx, [esp+8+arg_8]
.text:1003745A 8B 7C 24 0C                             mov     edi, [esp+8+arg_0]
.text:1003745E 8B C1                                   mov     eax, ecx
.text:10037460 8B D1                                   mov     edx, ecx
.text:10037462 03 C6                                   add     eax, esi
.text:10037464 3B FE                                   cmp     edi, esi
.text:10037466 76 08                                   jbe     short loc_10037470

Because of this unique prologue, the function can be quickly identified with the following bytes:

57 56 8B 74 24 10 8B 4C 24 14 8B 7C 24 0C 8B C1 8B D1 03 C6 3B FE 76 08

The values of the ESI and EDI registers are stored in the stack at the beginning and will be restored once the function is exited.

The purpose of the function is to copy the string/data passed as an argument to the function as follows:

memcpy( DestinationString = edi , SourceString = esi, NumberOfBytesToWrite = ecx )

The memcopy operations will be performed in several ways, one of which uses the instruction rep movsd.

Most branches restore the value passed by parameter in the EAX register and the values that the ESI and EDI registers initially had. It is possible, however, to find other blocks that indicate that it could have a different behavior.

But if we analyze the function in depth, we’ll see that most blocks perform similar operations, only that they are carried out through other instructions.

Through the script that has been created, the function is identified and patched so that it can be skipped, facilitating its analysis.

Original code:

Patched code: -> find_and_rename_memcpy_function

Fake calls

Fake calls are API calls that will never happen. Their sole purpose is to make the analyst think that the binary has a functionality that it does not have; they are junk code.

To remove these fake calls, the opaque predicates that precede them will have to be removed. Once removed, the fake function calls (if any) should be removed as well.

.text:1000166B 74 9C              jz      short loc_10001609 <- Opaque Predicate
.text:1000166D 75 0A              jnz     short loc_10001679 <- Opaque Predicate
.text:1000166F FF 15 80 90 03 10  call    ds:LocalAllocx     <- Fake Call
.text:10021CB9 0F 84 9D 00 00 00  jz      loc_10021D5C <- Opaque Predicate
.text:10021CBF 75 0A              jnz     short loc_10021CCB <- Opaque Predicate
.text:10021CC1 FF 15 04 92 03 10  call    ds:LsaConnectUntrusted <- Fake Call
.text:10021C11 0F 84 09 F9 FD FF  jz      loc_10001520   <- Opaque Predicate
.text:10021C17 0F 85 03 F9 FD FF  jnz     loc_10001520   <- Opaque Predicate
.text:10021C1D FF 15 00 91 03 10  call    ds:CreateFileW <- Fake Call

We can locate these kinds of calls using the following expressions:

74 ?? 75 ?? FF 15
75 ?? 74 ?? FF 15
0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ?? FF 15
0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 74 ?? FF 15
0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF 15
0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF 15

And then we simply have to patch them:

Original 74 ?? 75 ?? FF 15:


Original 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ?? FF 15:


Original 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF 15:




maze_patcher -> delete_fake_calls_before_jz_jnz()

Opaque predicates with intermediate jumps and junk code

In the code you can find opaque predicates where each instruction jumps to a different address, but finally they end up in the same place, as you can see in the following example:

It can be identified by the following expressions:

68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ??
68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 74 ??

Through these expressions you will find the blocks that have opaque predicates, but it is necessary to check if they also present this behavior with intermediate jumps.

It is assumed, after analysis, that the following conditions are met:

  • The first jz or jnz instruction is the one that contains the final address.
  • The second jz or jnz instruction contains the intermediate address. This intermediate address contains another conditional jmp instruction that points to the same final address as the first conditional jmp instruction.
.text:1002AFE3 68 1D B0 02 10     push  offset loc_1002B01D
.text:1002AFE8 0F 84 12 6E 00 00  jz    loc_10031E00        <- Final Addr
.text:1002AFEE 75 04              jnz   short loc_1002AFF4  <- Intermediate Addr
.text:1002AFF0 E2 1B              loop  loc_1002B00D
.text:1002AFF2 00                 db    0
.text:1002AFF3 00                 db    0
.text:1002AFF4                         loc_1002AFF4:
.text:1002AFF4 0F 85 06 6E 00 00  jnz  loc_10031E00        <- Final Addr
.text:1002AFFA 74 04              jz   short loc_1002B000  <- Junk Code
.text:1002AFFC 13 1A              adc  ebx, [edx]

Once the code is patched, it looks much better and easier to follow: -> obfuscated_jz_jnz_2()

Anti-debug techniques

As if the sample did not already have enough countermeasures to make its analysis complicated by obfuscation, it also implements the following anti-debug techniques:

  • Checking BeingDebugged flag
  • DbgUIRemoteBreaking patch
  • Windows Language Code Identifier (LCID) check
  • Process blacklist

Checking BeingDebugged flag

Some of the blocks feature checks of the BeingDebugged flag. At this point there are several solutions:

  • Use a plugin that hides the debugger so that even if the PEB is checked it does not have the BeingDebugged flag set to 1.
  • Modify the BeingDebugged flag the first time it is checked during the dynamic analysis.
  • Patch all blocks that perform the BeingDebugged check and force them to go the appropriate way regardless of the BeingDebugged

DbgUIRemoteBreaking patch

Another of the anti-debug techniques used by Maze is patching the DbgUIRemoteBreaking function to prevent the debugger from following the analysis, which involves using VirtualProtect.

To avoid this technique, a breakpoint must be set in the kernel32->VirtualProtect function:

During execution, Maze tries to change the permissions to 0x40(PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) at the first byte of the function in order to patch it.

Accessing the address where the DbgUIRemoteBreakin function is located, we can see that it is still unmodified:

Following the execution, we will see how Maze patches the first byte with the C3 opcode (return).

Then Maze will run VirtualProtect again to modify the permissions of the first byte and reset it to 0x20 (PAGE_EXECUTE_READ). At this point it is possible to patch again to its original value, replacing C3 with 6A, restoring the function to its original form. You can use a conditional breakpoint for this.

Windows Language Code Identifier (LCID) check

The function, GetUserDefaultUILanguage checks the LCID and compares it against a hardcoded list. If it matches any of the values that belong to countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or Ukraine, it will not encrypt any file.

Some examples:



Process blacklist

Using the kernel32 functions CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and Process32NextW will list the processes.

For each process name listed, it will perform the following actions:

  • It will change the name of the process to lowercase.
  • It will convert the name of the original process to one generated according to some constants.

Example with smss.exe is converted to QOQQ/GZG

  • Calculates the CRC of the intermediate name with the Adler32 algorithm.
  • Finally, it compares the generated CRC against the hardcoded values, which correspond to the blacklisted processes.

ida.exe is among the process names it checks.

In order to facilitate the analysis tasks, and not have to modify the name during the process enumeration, it is recommended to rename ida.exe to a random name.

New Versions

Some recent samples of Maze incorporate the technique analyzed in the last article about the Maze loader, Control Flow Flattening, along with different obfuscation techniques directly in the DLL. In addition, those graphs appear contiguously and it is possible to compare the blocks previously analyzed and observe that it is the same technique.



The upper part of the image below is the first graph showing the Maze loader obfuscated with control flow flattening.

In the lower part, there is another graph, which corresponds to the part of the DLL that was analyzed, showing it has been obfuscated with control flow flattening as the Maze loader.  Although it looks smaller than the above graph, this is simply because IDA is not able to represent it correctly due to obfuscation and cuts the graph at that point.


Throughout this article, the most relevant techniques used by Maze DLL have been explained, with the goal that the researcher will be able to identify them and apply the scripts provided in order to facilitate the analysis of Maze ransomware samples.

Creating a script that supports changes in the obfuscation methods used by Maze as a whole is complex. Instead of attacking the whole problem at the same time, we’ve tried to isolate each problem and solve each type of obfuscation one by one, supporting different versions, as well as allowing the researcher to understand the techniques used. This way, if there are possible changes in future versions, the researcher will be able to find an appropriate solution to the new problems.


  • Maze Ransomware DLL version 1
  • Maze Ransomware DLL to EXE version 1
  • Maze Ransomware DLL version 2.1.1
  •  Maze Ransomware DLL version 2.3

Links to script repository

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