China Fails in Attempt to Infiltrate the U.S. Army Reserves
Last week, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) announced that a Chinese national had been arrested for allegedly acting within the United States as an illegal agent of the People’s Republic of China. With the presumption of innocence indicated through the judicious use of the word “allegedly,” the accompanying narrative and criminal complaint provide detail into China’s attempt to seed Ji Chaoqun (Ji), one of their own, into the U.S. Army Reserves for the purpose of committing espionage.
The circuitous road Ji took—from enrolling as a foreign national student at the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) in 2013 to being accepted into the U.S. Army Reserves in 2016 as an E4 Specialist under the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program—fits the modus operandi evidenced in other cases involving students from China being dispatched to the United States for the long-term purpose of conducting espionage.
Ji Chaoqun: Prepare to be Seeded into the United States
Ji is a 27-year old male who was born in China and who arrived in the United States Aug. 28, 2013, on an F1 Visa—a foreign student visa—to pursue graduate studies. He was enrolled IIT where he was pursuing his Master’s in Electrical Engineering, which he received in December 2015.
Prior to his arrival in the United States, Ji had been primed by Chinese intelligence officers to prepare himself to be seeded into the United States on behalf of China. Page 12 of the criminal complaint details how the meetings in China groomed Ji for his travel to the United States, likening the experience to that of the “Long-Tan-San-Jie,” who were three covert China Communist Party agents seeded inside the Kuomintang (KMT).
The footnote on the page explains how this event, which occurred in the 1920, was an early example of “Chinese ‘seeding operations.’” Clearly, Ji was being sent to the United States to operate on behalf of Chinese intelligence, even though he was not formally an intelligence officer.
Initial U.S. Activities of Ji
As early as November 2013, forensic evidence culled from the SMS text messages and Apple iCloud account associated with Ji’s phone indicate he was introduced to a Chinese intelligence officer by one of his colleagues, thus establishing Ji’s contact with two Chinese intelligence officers—one he apparently knew upon arrival in the United States and a second to whom he was introduced shortly after his arrival. The FBI assessed that both intelligence officers were associated with the JSSD (Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security), a provincial department of the Ministry of State Security (MSS). One of the Chinese intel officers was identified as the Deputy Division Director within the JSSD, and having been associated with the MSS since June 2003.
In August 2015, while still a grad student at IIT, Ji was operational, acting on behalf of the JSSD/MSS. He sent eight targeting files on U.S.-based individuals. The files’ contents were acquired via Intelius, Instant Checkmate, and Spokeo, all commercial search entities. In all, Ji spent about US$700 for the information.
The individuals, unwitting of their being targeted, were all naturalized U.S. citizens either born in Taiwan or China and residing in the United States. All eight were involved in the science and technology arena, with some involved in aerospace. Furthermore, at least seven of them either were actively or had worked for a U.S. defense contractor.
Ji’s in the U.S. Army Reserves
In May 2016, Ji enlisted in the U.S. Army reserves as an E4/Specialist under the MAVNI program. Ji filed his SF-86 national security position questionnaire in June 2016 and, as one might expect, omitted his Chinese intelligence contacts. Then, again during his December 2016 Single Scope Background Investigation, (SSBI) interview, he provided false information to the interviewing officer.
Hooking and Sinking Ji
With the above in hand, the FBI then set up a sting in late April 2018 and introduced an undercover FBI Special Agent into the equation. The Special Agent introduced himself as a Chinese intelligence officer sent to meet Ji, given his primary contact had been arrested. Ji bought the story and proceeded over the course of a couple of face-to-face meetings to implicate himself by confirming the information discovered via technical collection and forensic examination.
Ji’s Long-Term Goals
While the publicly available court records don’t include what duties Ji had during the period he was active with the U.S. Army Reserves, it should suffice to say that it was ever increasing, given he transitioned from enlistee to service member needing an SSBI enhanced clearance.
Furthermore, as detailed in the page 12 footnote of the criminal complaint, the MAVNI program provides highly skilled and desirable foreign nationals who are serving in the U.S. Armed Forces an expedited pathway toward U.S. citizenship.
It is not difficult to speculate that the long-term goal of the MSS was to have Ji achieve U.S. citizenship, continue within the U.S. Army Reserves, acquire a national security clearance and obtain employment with a U.S. defense contractor within the aerospace industry.
Solo Flyer or Part of a Flock?
What we have initially learned from this case involving Ji is that the Chinese intelligence apparatus continues to utilize the U.S. higher education system as its seeding platform for long-term penetration of U.S. entities, including the U.S. Army.
Furthermore, the Chinese understand, completely, that with citizenship comes trust, and thus a seeded asset with U.S. citizenship is more likely to be eligible to garner access to classified information than one who remains a Chinese citizen.
And finally, the tasking provided to Ji to gather information on Taiwan- or Chinese-born U.S. citizens provides further evidence of China’s desire to target ethnic-Chinese U.S. citizens for espionage.
