
Big Code
In our Machine Learning (ML) for secure code
series the mantra has always been the same:
to figure out how to leverage the power of ML to
detect security vulnerabilities in source code,
regardless of the
technique, be it deep
learning, graph mining,
natural language processing, or anomaly
detection.
In this article we present a new player in the field,
DeepCode, a system that has exactly this
purpose, combining ML with data flow analysis, namely in the form of
taint analysis.
Taint analysis can come in dynamic and static forms and can be performed
at the source and binary levels, but either way, the goal is the same.
Start by looking at where input comes from and is controlled by the
user, for example, a web app search field. These are named sources in
this context. Then, continue to follow the thread to where it gets used
by the system in a security-critical fashion, as in using that info to
query a database, to continue with the previous example. These points
are called sinks.
Figure 1. Taint analysis diagram via Coseinc.
Along the way in the case of a secure application, data should encounter
significant input sanitization or validation. These are called
sanitizers in the taint analysis context. However, frequently this
does not happen, and thus vulnerabilities arise.
Traditional taint analysis tools, however, usually present high false
positive rates, as is the case with
Bandit and
Pyt (see some critique
here).
DeepCode’s purpose is to remove minor difficulties these taint
analysis tools may have. DeepCode does this by learning from the vast
quantity of freely-available, high-quality code in open repositories
such as Github, a circumstance then dubbed “Big
Code”. The tool is easy and free to use. This provides the added
advantage of also learning from the user’s code, the suggestions made by
the tool, and the user’s feedback (accepting suggestions, how to fix
them, etc).
Another problem with taint analysis is that sources, sinks, and
sanitizers need to be specified by hand, which is extremely impractical
for large-scale projects. This is another area where ML helps
DeepCode, but how is that done?
DeepCode has been called Grammarly for
code. It claims to be 90% accurate, and that it understands the intent
behind the code. It also claims to find twice as many issues as other
tools, even some critical ones (XSS, SQL injection and path
traversal, etc.) which is something typical static analysis tools do
not. Moreover, it claims to be easy to use, requiring no configuration.
The tool is friendly. You need only point it to your repository and give
the appropriate permissions, and then it will show a dashboard with the
issues found. Here is one for Eclipse Che Cloud
IDE:
Figure 2. Security issues dashboard for Eclipse Che, adapted from DeepCode
demo.
Here we see three instances of a possible path traversal vulnerability.
In the full dashboard, we also see how they report an insecure HTTPS
channel, a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), a Cross Site Scripting
(XSS) vulnerability, and a header that leaks technical information
(X-Powered-By). And that’s only the issues tagged as “security”. There
are also API misuse issues, v.g. using Thread.run()
instead ofThread.start()
, general bugs or defects, and now they even throw lint
tools results, which deal with formatting and presentation issues. Oh,
yes, and every issue comes with a possible fix you might implement right
away.
Quite nice, from the point of view of contributing a new vulnerability
report to a project, with no false positives. However when the aim is to
find all vulnerabilities, one cannot help but raise the question: is
that all? Are these all the security vulnerabilities in a project with
more than 300,000
lines of code?
Let us take one of the many Vulnerable by Design (VbD) applications we
use for training purposes in our challenges
site, and see
how many vulnerabilities come up by running DeepCode on them. By the
way, they currently support Javascript, TypeScript and Java,
besides the original Python. That leaves us with two apps to try: the
Damn Vulnerable NodeJS Application
(DVNA) and Damn Small Vulnerable
Web (DSVW), since most VbD apps
are built with PHP.
I forked both of these on Github, signed up for a DeepCode account,
and let it run. For DSVW, which is a single Python file under 100
lines of code, but still ridden with vulnerabilities, DeepCode reports
zero issues. Perhaps it does not work as well on such tiny projects.
Figure 3. Zero issues in DSVW.
This is, to say the least, disappointing, since that DSVW has no less
than 26 different kinds of vulnerabilities, as per its README. In
Writeups,
three of those have been manually explored and exploited.
Maybe it’s a problem with having so few lines of code, maybe it’s a
Python thing, so let’s try the other one: DVNA, built with NodeJS
with the specific purpose of demonstrating the OWASP Top 10
vulnerabilities.
This time around, DeepCode found 9 issues. Of those, take out the 3
which come from ESLint
, and let’s consider the other 6; 2 are API
misuses, which are basically “use arrows instead of functions” and 4 are
security vulnerabilities, and pretty serious ones at that:
Code Injection via
eval
function in calculator module. Not the
same one as in the authors’ security guide. Also not yet reported in
Writeups
This should be researched further.SQL injection. As per security
guide
and
Writeups.Open Redirect. Also in the security
guide
and
Writeups.Technical information leakage via the X-Powered-By header, as in
Che
.
So, altogether, 3 noteworthy security vulnerabilities, in a NodeJS
application with more than 7,500 lines of code. In
Writeups, at least 29
different vulnerabilities have been reported in DVNA. You can see a
report
on manual testing vs the LGTM code-as-data tool in
there, too, where it is quite clear that tool misses most of the
vulnerabilities as well.
Now for a more realistic test, let’s try running DeepCode on some of
our own repos, namely, Integrates, our platform for vulnerability
centralization and management and
asserts, our vulnerability
automation framework. Both are
open-source, written in Python, and
actively developed. As before, the vast majority of issues found by
DeepCode are of the lint and API usage kind.
Figure 4. Integrates Dashboard
In Integrates,
the platform that our clients use for vulnerability management,
we see a possible command injection in the spreadsheet
report generation function. However, this input is not controllable by
the user, so this does not pose a real threat at the moment:
Command Injection in Integrates?.
However, the suggestion to sanitize the input via subprocess.call()
is
not bad. Who knows if Integrates will later have user-configurable
passwords for reports, or a different vulnerability enables an
attacker to change this parameter.
The other security issue is in the PDF report generation, this time
identified as Path traversal. Again, probably difficult to exploit,
but should be sanitized anyway.
In Asserts, however, the 15
issues found by DeepCode are less worrisome, for two reasons:
Asserts is not a
client-server application, but an API that runs locally.Most of the 15 issues are several instances of SSRF, when
Asserts makes HTTP
requests via Requests,
generally to client’s ToEs as one would in a browser.
Of course, all the issues detected by DeepCode will be taken care of.
Once again, this confirms our other mantra we have held in this
Machine Learning (ML) series and also
elsewhere on
our
website. While automated tools, even
ML-powered ones, may have the potential to do what a human could not
do in terms of repetitions and scalability, as of yet, they do not have
the malice or creativity which humans have in finding critical and
interesting security vulnerabilities.
References
V. Raychev. 2018. DeepCode releases the first practical anomaly bug
detector.V. Chibotaru. 2019. Meet the tool that automatically infers security
vulnerabilities in Python code.
Hackernoon
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Fluid Attacks RSS Feed authored by Rafael Ballestas. Read the original post at: https://fluidattacks.com/blog/big-code/