Many systems make installing 3rd party software incredibly convenient; from packaging systems and well loved Linux distribution tools like Debian Apt to app stores and per-language repositories. Users are also often allowed to install browser extensions or plugins, which come from their own “store” and are just another type of software. For these reasons, and without forgetting containers, maintaining a software inventory that allows you to identify dangerous packages has become harder to do, but more critical to accomplish.
Research shows, time and time again, that threat actors will go the distance and either push malicious packages with names similar to legitimate ones, or attempt to make existing legitimate packages malicious by attacking their source code repositories or by buying them from legitimate maintainers. Supply chain attacks are difficult to defend against even by the best prepared organizations, and that’s on top of all the vulnerabilities that occur naturally during legitimate software development cycles.
In recent news, ReversingLabs discovered many such packages in the Python repository, PyPI. Packages such as libpeshnx, which itself was being installed 82 times a month, were discovered with backdoors.
About a year ago, npm suffered the event-stream incident, where an attacker impersonated the maintainer of the package to inject code in event-stream which would then detect running cryptocurrency wallets and steal the private keys, offloading them to an external server.
All repositories are amazing targets for attackers. The software they host is usually trusted, and one command away from being installed. (Read more...)
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Uptycs Blog authored by Guillaume Ross. Read the original post at: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/using-osquery-for-complete-software-inventory