
Cybereason vs. DarkSide Ransomware
Using reg.exe to steal credentials stored in the SAM hive on the DC
In addition to collecting data from the DC, the attackers use PowerShell to download the DarkSide binary from the shared folder created on the previously infected host:
The PowerShell command executed on the DC
The attackers also create a shared folder using the company’s name on the DC itself, and copies the DarkSide binary. Later in the attack, after all data has been exfiltrated, the attackers use bitsadmin.exe to distribute the ransomware binary from the shared folder to other assets in the environment in order to maximize the damage:
Downloading the DarkSide ransomware binary from a remote machine using shared folders
In order to execute the ransomware on the DC, the attackers create a scheduled task called “Test1” that is configured to execute the ransomware:
Execution of the DarkSide ransomware via a scheduled task
The scheduled task Test1, used to run the ransomware on the DC
DarkSide Analysis
When the DarkSide ransomware first executes on the infected host, it checks the language on the system, using GetSystemDefaultUILanguage() and GetUserDefaultLangID() functions to avoid systems located in the former Soviet Bloc countries from being encrypted:
Debugging the ransomware – checking if the installed language is Russian (419)
The malware doesn’t encrypt files on systems with the following languages installed:
Russian – 419 |
Azerbaijani (Latin) – 42C |
Uzbek (Latin) – 443 |
Uzbek (Cyrillic) – 843 |
Ukranian – 422 |
Georgian – 437 |
Tatar – 444 |
Arabic (Syria) – 2801 |
Belarusian – 423 |
Kazakh – 43F |
Romanian (Moldova) – 818 |
|
Tajik – 428 |
Kyrgyz (Cyrillic) – 440 |
Russian (Moldova) – 819 |
|
Armenian – 42B |
Turkmen – 442 |
Azerbaijani (Cyrillic) – 82C |
DarkSide then proceeds to stop the following services related to security and backup solutions:
vss |
sql |
svc |
memtas |
mepocs |
sophos |
veeam |
backup |
Debugging the ransomware – stopping services, and creates connection to the hardcoded C2
It then creates a connection to its C2 (command and control) server, and in different samples analyzed, the attackers use the following domains and IPs:
198.54.117[.]200 198.54.117[.]198 198.54.117[.]199 198.54.117[.]197 |
temisleyes[.]com catsdegree[.]com |
After uninstalling the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS), DarkSide then deletes the shadow copies by launching an obfuscated PowerShell script that uses WMI to delete them:
Debugging the ransomware – creating a PowerShell process
The PowerShell commands as shown in the Cybereason defence platform
The de-obfuscated PowerShell script:
Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();}
The malware then enumerates the running processes and terminates different processes to unlock their files so it can both steal related information stored in the files and encrypt them.
DarkSide creates a unique User_ID string for the victim, and adds it to the encrypted files extension as follows:
<File_name>.{userid}. In addition, the malware also changes the icons for the encrypted files and changes the background of the desktop:
Background set by DarkSide
And, of course, it leaves a ransom note: “README.{userid}.TXT”:
DarkSide ransom note
Cybereason Detection and Prevention
The Cybereason Defense Platform is able to prevent the execution of the DarkSide Ransomware using multi-layer protection that detects and blocks malware with threat intelligence, machine learning, and next-gen antivirus (NGAV) capabilities. Additionally, when the Anti-Ransomware feature is enabled, behavioral detection techniques in the platform are able to detect and prevent any attempt to encrypt files and generates a MalopTM for it:
Malop for DarkSide ransomware as shown in the Cybereason Defence Platform
Malop for DarkSide ransomware as shown in the Cybereason Defence Platform
Using the Anti-Malware feature with the right configurations (listed in the recommendations below), the Cybereason Defense Platform will also detect and prevent the execution of the ransomware and ensure that it cannot encrypt targeted files. The prevention is based on machine learning, which blocks both known and unknown malware variants:

Prevention alert of DarkSide ransomware as shown in the Cybereason Defence Platform
Cybereason user notification for preventing the execution of DarkSide
Security Recommendations
• Enable the Anti-Ransomware Feature on Cybereason NGAV: Set Cybereason Anti-Ransomware protection mode to Prevent – more information for customers can be found here
• Enable Anti-Malware Feature on Cybereason NGAV: Set Cybereason Anti-Malware mode to Prevent and set the detection mode to Moderate and above – more information can be found here
• Keep Systems Fully Patched: Make sure your systems are patched in order to mitigate vulnerabilities
• Regularly Backup Files to a Remote Server: Restoring your files from a backup is the fastest way to regain access to your data
• Use Security Solutions: Protect your environment using organizational firewalls, proxies, web filtering, and mail filtering
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
Lateral Movement |
Execution |
Persistence |
Defense Evasion |
Credential Access |
Discovery |
Command and Control |
Impact |
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*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Blog authored by Lior Rochberger. Read the original post at: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware