A new FireEye report shows a recent spike in URL-based HTTPS phishing
If you’re a regular reader of Hashed Out, you know that we have been sounding the alarm on HTTPS phishing for a couple of years now. Recently, the Anti-Phishing Working Group published a study that found 58% of all phishing websites are now served via HTTPS. Some reports put that number as high as 90%.
On Tuesday, FireEye released its Q1 2019 Phishing Trends report and one of its key findings is that HTTPS phishing is continuing to evolve.
In 2018, FireEye reported that URL-based attacks had overtaken attachment-based attacks as a means of delivery. This trend continued in Q1 2019. URL-based attacks are harder to identify because they require a more dynamic means of detection.
So, today, we’re going to talk about what URL-based HTTPS
phishing is, the rate at which it’s increasing and we’ll wax philosophic about
how get here.
Let’s hash it out.
Free SSL and the rise of HTTPS Phishing
The original SSL certificate was actually Organization Validation. And at least part of the thinking was that since we’re trying to teach users that HTTPS is synonymous with security, it would be kind of counterproductive if malicious actors could easily slap a certificate on their website and make it say “https://.”
That was a somewhat noble, if deeply flawed approach. Obviously, there shouldn’t be an economic barrier to HTTPS. All websites should be encrypting their connections, it’s basically a standard at this point thanks to the browsers. The downside of that is when something is universally available – when there is zero barrier – bad guys can get it, too.
Now we’re kind of at a crossroads where the old talking points, about looking for the protocol and the padlock, are being taken advantage of by phishing websites and criminals. There’s already so much that can be done to make a website look convincing, that extra little flourish just really brings it home sometimes.
Now, we are not blaming free SSL – we have to make this
disclaimer every single time – public CAs are a good thing. But like all good
things people find ways to take advantage.
HTTPS phishing is one of the most pernicious ways of all of them.
What is URL-based HTTPS phishing?
Generally, when we refer to HTTPS phishing we’re discussing
the landing page or watering hole site that a user arrives at. It’s easy to get
confused because phishing is often considered to be “just an email thing,” but
really, the email is usually just the opening salvo. Sometimes it asks you to
open an attachment. Other times it takes you to a malicious website.
The problem is that phishing can be combated with education. Studies show that with phishing simulations run over time, and with enough frequency, employees can show marked improvement when it comes to identifying phishing emails. And a couple of the tenants of those educational simulations are not to trust attachments and to avoid following suspicious links.
So, as the proverbial game of cat and mouse continues now the
criminals are evolving.
FireEye identifies two different variants of URL-based attacks – well, really one is a variation of the other – but the premise is basically the same in each: send an email with no content; only a believable link in the body.
Now, I realize that sounds incredibly dumb. And it wouldn’t work on its own if it’s emanating from a random email address that the target wouldn’t recognize. But when coupled with other tactics, it’s clearly working well enough that FireEye has noticed a 26% increase over the first three months of 2019.
In fact, URL-based attacks are now the most prevalent method for delivering a malicious payload.
Quick example, with a little social engineering, you can change the “from:” field in an email to someone in the company. Here’s an email purporting to be from our owner:
Now, if you’re diligent you could verify the actual address it came from or check the email header, but a lot of people aren’t going to do that.
You can see how someone could fall for it. This looks like it came from Dan in sales and he’s always sending you funny stuff and you click on it.
So, that’s the first variant, the content-less email. It’s literally just a link.
This has the added benefit of making it harder for spam
filters to detect. The lack of content in the email itself doesn’t give the filter
enough to know whether or not it’s malicious. And obviously, as we just touched
on it plays on the curiosity and impetuousness of the target.
Then there’s a variant of the no content email, which is to make the link non-clickable. That way it makes it even harder for the filter to detect because there’s no active link in the email. The link isn’t active until the target pastes it into their browser’s address bar.
It almost seems like the sender just forgot to hit return on the line before sending the email.
Now, these emails occur without the HTTPS component, too.
You don’t HAVE to have an SSL certificate to do it. But, being able to affix
HTTPS to the beginning of that URL adds another layer of believability and, as
we’ve discussed, sometimes it’s that last little brush stroke that pushes it
over the threshold.
Again, the only defense with any level of efficacy is education.
What do we do about HTTPS phishing?
At this point, it’s probably too late to put the toothpaste
back into the tube. And some in the industry are taking action. Google, which
has really led the way on the entire HTTPS initiative, is in the process of
scaling back its visual indicators.
Ideally, it wants to remove the protocol (https://) and the padlock from the address bar entirely and just give HTTPS sites neutral treatment. HTTP sites are already receiving a negative indicator. The idea would be that HTTPS is now the status quo.
The bigger question the industry is wrestling with is how do
you treat the higher-validation certificates. Historically, OV has received the
same treatment as DV. It might be worth continuing to allow OV sites to use the
padlock. And of course the debate over EV never ends. At this point it’s not
even really worth re-hashing as everyone seems to be so entrenched in their
beliefs on the topic.
Suffice to say, at the very least we can’t keep giving DV sites positive indicators. In the long run, we would be wise to overhaul our trust indicators entirely.
As always, leave any comments or questions below…
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Hashed Out by The SSL Store™ authored by Patrick Nohe. Read the original post at: https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/https-phishing-the-rise-of-url-based-attacks/