TrickBot: New Injects, New Host
What’s in the Name: Call it IcedID or TrickBot? Tell that to a security researcher (Arsh Arora in this case) and watch them RANT
(Gar-note: today’s blog post is a guest blog from malware analyst, Arsh Arora…)
Today’s post starts with an interesting link from Dawid Golak’s Medium post: “IcedID aka# Bokbot Analysis with Ghidra” which mentions that IcedID is dropping TrickBot. Although the article is about IcedID, it gets confusing quickly, because the researcher focused on finding artifacts for IcedID instead finds TrickBot artifacts. A big question for the security industry still remain is to how to classify the malware from the originator or the binary that is being dropped. We followed up on the sample he mentioned and saw the same thing. This is definitely Trickbot.
First Stage – Sample Collection from Virus Total Intelligence
In the “AnyRun Analysis” linked to by Dawid, the TrickBot binary was downloaded from “54.36.218[.]96 (slash) tin[.]exe
Virus total link (50/ 71 detections) https://www.virustotal.com/intelligence/search/?query=84878B4967A4243CD904794F3B8B2812
Fig 1: TrickBot Sample |
Second Stage – Sample Execution
After the execution in a virtual environment, I was able to see TrickBot behavior similar to what we have documented in the past in our post “Trickbot’s New Magic Trick: Sending Spam“:
A large number of config files and dlls were loaded into the Roaming/netcache/Data, a unique behavior of the TrickBot binary.
Fig 2: Configs and Dlls Loaded |
Third Stage – Open Firefox and visit different Bank website
It is often the case that to get any banking trojan to co-operate with the researcher, some initiation from the researcher side is needed. Due to past experience, I have learned that one needs to open up a browser and visit different bank websites to activate the banking trojan. The trojan resists until instigated by visits to these pages. I visited close to 20 different bank websites and was able to obtain injects from 7 of those bank websites. The injects and admin login panels of the websites are as follows.
Name of Bank | Admin Login Panel | IP | Location |
Bank of America | https://aefaldnessliverhearted[.]com/load/ | 185.242.6.245 | AS9009, Prague |
Chase | https://aefaldnessliverhearted[.]com/load/ | 185.242.6.245 | AS9009, Prague |
Citi | https://remirollerros[.]com/legr/ | 109.234.37.246 | AS48282, RU |
Usaa | https://onlylocaltrade[.]com/lob.php | 185.87.187.198 | AS48635,NL |
WellsFargo | https://wellsfargostrade.com/2wells2 | 185.36.189.143 | AS50673, NL |
PNC | https://wellsfargostrade[.]com/pncadmin/index.php | 185.36.189.143 | AS50673, NL |
53 Bank | https://wellsfargostrade[.]com/53repadmin2 | 185.36.189.143 | AS50673, NL |
When infected, viewing the source code while visiting one of the banks is all that is needed to identify the data exfiltration destination. Some examples follow from this infection run:
BankofAmerica
Fig 3: BoA Web Inject |
Chase
Fig 4: Chase Web Inject |
Fig 5: BoA and Chase Admin Panel |
Citi
Fig 6: Citi Web Inject |
USAA
Fig 8: USAA Web Inject |
WellsFargo
Fig 9: WellsFargo Web Inject |
Fig 10: WellsFargo Admin Panel |
PNC
Fig 11: PNC Web Inject |
Fig 12: PNC Admin Panel |
53 Bank
Fig 13: 53 Bank Web Inject |
Fig 14: 53 Bank Admin Panel |
For more details please contact Arsh Arora (ararora at uab.edu) or Gary Warner (gar at uab.edu) at UAB. Please note: Arsh is defending his PhD this summer and looking for new opportunities.
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from CyberCrime & Doing Time authored by MalwareSecrets. Read the original post at: http://garwarner.blogspot.com/2019/06/trickbot-new-injects-new-host.html