Metamorfo Campaigns Targeting Brazilian Users

FireEye Labs recently identified several widespread malspam (malware
spam) campaigns targeting Brazilian companies with the goal of
delivering banking Trojans. We are referring to these campaigns as
Metamorfo. Across the stages of these campaigns, we have observed the
use of several tactics and techniques to evade detection and deliver
the malicious payload. In this blog post we dissect two of the main
campaigns and explain how they work.

Campaign #1

The kill chain starts with an email containing an HTML attachment
with a refresh tag that uses a Google URL shortener as the
target. Figure 1 shows a sample email, and Figure 2 show the contents
of the HTML file.



Figure 1: Malicious Email with HTML Attachment



Figure 2: Contents of HTML File

When the URL is loaded, it redirects the victim to a cloud storage
site such as GitHub, Dropbox, or Google Drive to download a ZIP
file. An example is shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3: URL Shortener Redirects to
Github Link

The ZIP archive contains a malicious portable executable (PE) file
with embedded HTML application (HTA). The user has to unzip the
archive and double-click the executable for the infection chain to
continue. The PE file is a simple HTA script compiled into an
executable. When the user double-clicks the executable, the malicious
HTA file is extracted to %temp% and executed by mshta.exe.

The HTA script (Figure 4) contains VBS code that fetches a second
blob of VBS code encoded in base64 form from hxxp://<redacted>/ilha/pz/logs.php. 



Figure 4: Contents of HTA File

After the second stage of VBS is decoded (Figure 5 and Figure 6),
the script downloads the final stage from hxxp://<redacted>/28022018/pz.zip. 



Figure 5: Contents of Decoded VBS



Figure 6: More Contents of Decoded VBS

The downloaded ZIP file contains four files. Two are PE files. One
is a legitimate Windows tool, pvk2pfx.exe, that is abused
for DLL side-loading. One is the malicious banking Trojan as the DLL.

The VBS code unzips the archive, changes the extension of the
legitimate Windows tool from .png to .exe, and renames the malicious
DLL as cryptui.dll. The VBS code also creates a file in
C:\Users\Public\Administrador\car.dat with random strings. These
random strings are used to name the Windows tool, which is then
executed. Since this tool depends on a legitimate DLL named
cryptui.dll, the search order path will find the malicious Trojan with
the same name in the same directory and load it into its process space.

In Q4 of 2017, a similar malspam campaign delivered the same banking
Trojan by using an embedded JAR file attached in the email instead of
an HTML attachment. On execution, the Java code downloaded a ZIP
archive from a cloud file hosting site such as Google Drive, Dropbox,
or Github. The ZIP archive contained a legitimate Microsoft tool and
the malicious Trojan.

Banking Trojan Analysis

The Trojan expects to be located in the hardcoded directory
C:\\Users\\Public\Administrador\\ along with three other files to
start execution. As seen in Figure 7, these files are:

  • car.dat (randomly
    generated name given to Windows tool)
  • i4.dt (VBS script
    that downloads the same zip file)
  • id (ID given to
    host)
  • cryptui.dll (malicious Trojan)



Figure 7: Contents of ZIP Archive

Persistence

The string found in the file
C:\\Users\\Public\\Administrador\\car.dat is extracted and used to add
the registry key
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\<string from
car.dat> for persistence, as shown in Figure 8.



Figure 8: Reading from car.dat File

The sample also looks for a file named i4.dt in the same directory
and extracts the contents of it, renames the file to icone.vbs, and
creates a new persistent key (Figure 9) in
\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to open this file.



Figure 9: Persistence Keys

The VBS code in this file (Figure 10) has the ability to recreate
the whole chain and download the same ZIP archive.



Figure 10: Contents of VBS Script

Next, the Trojan searches for several folders in the Program Files
directories, including:

  • C:\\Program
    Files\\AVG
  • C:\\Program Files\\AVAST Software
  • C:\\Program Files\\Diebold\\Warsaw
  • C:\\Program
    Files\\Trusteer\\Rapport
  • C:\\Program Files\\Java
  • C:\\Program Files (x86)\\scpbrad

If any of the folders are found, this information, along with the
hostname and Operating System version, is sent to a hardcoded domain
with the hardcoded User-Agent value “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1;
WOW64; rv:12.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/12.0” in the format shown in
Figure 11. The value of AT is “<host_name+OS&MD>=<list of
folders found>”.



Figure 11: Network Traffic for Host Enumeration

The sample iterates through the running processes, kills the
following, and prevents them from launching:

  • msconfig.exe
  • TASKMGR.exe
  • regedit.exe
  • ccleaner64.exe
  • taskmgr.exe
  • itauaplicativo.exe

Next, it uses GetForegroundWindow to get a handle to the window the
user is viewing and GetWindowText to extract the title of the window.
The title is compared against a hardcoded list of Brazilian banking
and digital coin sites. The list is extensive and includes major
organizations and smaller entities alike. 

If any of those names are found and the browser is one of the
following, the Trojan will terminate that browser.

  • firefox.exe
  • chrome.exe
  • opera.exe
  • safari.exe

The folder C:\Users\Public\Administrador\logs\ is created to store
screenshots, as well as the number of mouse clicks the user has
triggered while browsing the banking sites (Figure 12). The
screenshots are continuously saved as .jpg images.



Figure 12: Malware Capturing Mouse Clicks

Command and Control

The command and control (C2) server is selected based on the string
in the file “id”:

  • al ->
    ‘185.43.209[.]182’
  • gr -> ‘212.237.46[.]6’
  • pz
    -> ‘87.98.146[.]34’
  • mn -> ’80.211.140[.]235′

The connection to one of the hosts is then started over raw TCP on
port 9999. The command and control communication generally follows the
pattern <|Command |>, for example:

  • ‘<|dispida|>logs>SAVE<‘ sends the screenshots
    collected in gh.txt.
  • ‘<PING>’ is sent from C2 to
    host, and ‘<PONG>’ is sent from host to C2, to keep the
    connection alive.
  • ‘<|INFO|>’ retrieves when the
    infection first started based on the file timestamp from car.dat
    along with ‘<|>’ and the host information.

There were only four possible IP addresses that the sample analyzed
could connect to based on the strings found in the file “id”. After
further researching the associated infrastructure of the C2 (Figure
13), we were able to find potential number of victims for this
particular campaign.

 

Figure 13: Command and Control Server Open Directories

Inside the open directories, we were able to get the following
directories corresponding to the different active campaigns. Inside
each directory we could find statistics with the number of victims
reporting to the C2. As of 3/27/2018, the numbers were:

  • al – 843
  • ap –
    879
  • gr – 397
  • kk – 2,153
  • mn – 296
  • pz – 536
  • tm – 187

A diagram summarizing Campaign #1 is shown in Figure 14.



Figure 14: Infection Chain of Campaign #1

Campaign #2

In the second campaign, FireEye Labs observed emails with links to
legitimate domains (such as
hxxps://s3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws[.]com/<redacted>/Boleto_Protesto_Mes_Marco_2018.html)
or compromised domains (such
as hxxps://curetusu.<redacted>-industria[.]site/) that use a
refresh tag with a URL shortener as the target.
The URL shortener redirects the user to an online storage site, such
as Google Drive, Github, or Dropbox, that hosts a malicious ZIP
file. A sample phishing email is shown in Figure 15.



Figure 15: Example Phishing Email

The ZIP file contains a malicious executable written in AutoIt
(contents of this executable are shown in Figur 16). When executed by
the user, it drops a VBS file to a randomly created and named
directory (such as C:\mYPdr\TkCJLQPX\HwoC\mYPdr.vbs) and fetches
contents from the C2 server.



Figure 16: Contents of Malicious AutoIt Executable

Two files are downloaded from the C2 server. One is a legitimate
Microsoft tool and the other is a malicious DLL: 

  • https[:]//panel-dark[.]com/w3af/img2.jpg
  • https[:]//panel-dark[.]com/w3af/img1.jpg

Those files are downloaded and saved into random directories named
with the following patterns:

  • <current user
    dir>\<5 random chars>\<8 random chars>\<4 random
    chars>\<5 random chars>.exe
  • <current user
    dir>\<5 random chars>\<8 random chars>\<4 random
    chars>\CRYPTUI.dll 

The execution chain ensures that persistence is set on the affected
system using a .lnk file in the Startup directory. The .lnk file shown
in Figure 17 opens the malicious VBS dropped on the system.



Figure 17: Persistence Key

The VBS file (Figure 18) will launch and execute the downloaded
legitimate Windows tool, which in this case is Certmgr.exe. This tool
will be abused using the DLL side loading technique. The malicious
Cryptui.dll is loaded into the program instead of the legitimate one
and executed.



Figure 18: Contents of Dropped VBS File

Banking Trojan Analysis

Like the Trojan from the first campaign, this sample is executed
through search-order hijacking. In this case, the binary abused is a
legitimate Windows tool, Certmgr.exe, that loads Cryptui.dll. Since
this tool depends on a legitimate DLL named cryptui.dll, the search
order path will find the malicious Trojan with the same name in the
same directory and load it into its process space.

The malicious DLL exports 21 functions. Only DllEntryPoint contains
real code that is necessary to start the execution of the malicious
code. The other functions return hardcoded values that serve no real purpose.

On execution, the Trojan creates a mutex called
"correria24" to allow only one instance of it to run at a time.

The malware attempts to resolve “www.goole[.]com” (most likely a
misspelling). If successful, it sends a request to
hxxp://api-api[.]com/json in order to detect the external IP of the
victim. The result is parsed and execution continues only if the
country code matches “BR”, as shown in Figure 19.



Figure 19: Country Code Check

The malware creates an empty file in %appdata%\Mariapeirura on first
execution, which serves as a mutex lock, before attempting to send any
collected information to the C2 server. This is done in order to get
only one report per infected host.

The malware collects host information, base64 encodes it, and sends
it to two C2 servers. The following items are gathered from the
infected system:

  • OS name
  • OS
    version
  • OS architecture
  • AV installed
  • List
    of banking software installed
  • IP address
  • Directory
    where malware is being executed from

The information is sent to hxxp://108.61.188.171/put.php (Figure 20).



Figure 20: Host Recon Data Sent to First
C2 Server

The same information is sent to panel-dark[.]com/Contador/put.php
(Figure 21).



Figure 21: Host Recon Data Sent to Second
C2 Server

The malware alters the value of registry key
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\ExtendedUIHoverTime
to 2710 in order to change the number of milliseconds a thumbnail is
showed while hovering on the taskbar, as seen in Figure 22.



Figure 22: ExtendedUIHoverTime Registry
Key Change

Like the Trojan from the first campaign, this sample checks if the
foreground window’s title contains names of Brazilian banks and
digital coins by looking for hardcoded strings.

The malware displays fake forms on top of the banking sites and
intercepts credentials from the victims. It can also display a fake
Windows Update whenever there is nefarious activity in the background,
as seen in Figure 23.



Figure 23: Fake Form Displaying Windows Update

The sample also contains a keylogger functionality, as shown in
Figure 24.



Figure 24: Keylogger Function

Command and Control

The Trojan’s command and control command structure is identical to
the first sample. The commands are denoted by the <|Command|> syntax.

  • <|OK|> gets a list
    of banking software installed on the host.
  • ‘<PING>’
    is sent from C2 to host, and ‘<PONG>’ is sent from host to C2,
    to keep connection alive.
  • <|dellLemb|> deletes the
    registry key \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.
  • EXECPROGAM calls ShellExecute to run the application given in
    the command.
  • EXITEWINDOWS calls ExitWindowsEx.
  • NOVOLEMBRETE creates and stores data sent with the command in
    the registry key \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.



Figure 25: Partial List of Victims

This sample contains most of the important strings encrypted. We
provide the following script (Figure 26) in order to decrypt them.



Figure 26: String Decryption Script

Conclusion

The use of multi-stage infection chains makes it challenging to
research these types of campaigns all the way through.

As demonstrated by our research, the attackers are using various
techniques to evade detection and infect unsuspecting
Portuguese-speaking users with banking Trojans. The use of public
cloud infrastructure to help deliver the different stages plays a
particularly big role in delivering the malicious payload. The use of
different infection methods combined with the abuse of legitimate
signed binaries to load malicious code makes these campaigns worth highlighting.

Indicators of Compromise

Campaign #1
TYPEHASHDESCRIPTION
MD5860fa744d8c82859b41e00761c6e25f3PE with Embedded HTA
MD53e9622d1a6d7b924cefe7d3458070d98PE with Embedded HTA
MD5f402a482fd96b0a583be2a265acd5e74PE with Embedded HTA
MD5f329107f795654bfc62374f8930d1e12PE with Embedded HTA
MD5789a021c051651dbc9e01c5d8c0ce129PE with Embedded HTA
MD568f818fa156d45889f36aeca5dc75a81PE with Embedded HTA
MD5c2cc04be25f227b13bcb0b1d9811e2fecryptui.dll
MD56d2cb9e726c9fac0fb36afc377be3aecid
MD5dd73f749d40146b6c0d2759ba78b1764i4.dt
MD5d9d1e72165601012b9d959bd250997b3VBS file with commands to create staging directories for
malware
MD503e4f8327fbb6844e78fda7cdae2e8adpvk2pfx.exe [Legit Windows Tool]
URL hxxp://5.83.162.24/ilha/pz/logs.php
URL hxxp://5.83.162.24/28022018/pz.zip 
C2 ibamanetibamagovbr[.]org/virada/pz/logs.php
URL sistemasagriculturagov[.]org
URL hxxp://187.84.229.107/05022018/al.zip
Campaign #2
TYPEHASHDESCRIPTION
MD52999724b1aa19b8238d4217565e31c8eAutoIT Dropper
MD5181c8f19f974ad8a84b8673d487bbf0dimg1.jpg [lLegit Windows Tool]
MD5d3f845c84a2bd8e3589a6fbf395fea06img2.jpg [Banking Trojan]
MD52365fb50eeb6c4476218507008d9a00bVariants of Banking Trojan
MD5d726b53461a4ec858925ed31cef15f1eVariants of Banking Trojan
MD5a8b2b6e63daf4ca3e065d1751cac723bVariants of Banking Trojan
MD5d9682356e78c3ebca4d001de760848b0Variants of Banking Trojan
MD5330721de2a76eed2b461f24bab7b7160Variants of Banking Trojan
MD56734245beda04dcf5af3793c5d547923Variants of Banking Trojan
MD5a920b668079b2c1b502fdaee2dd2358fVariants of Banking Trojan
MD5fe09217cc4119dedbe85d22ad23955a1Variants of Banking Trojan
MD582e2c6b0b116855816497667553bdf11Variants of Banking Trojan
MD54610cdd9d737ecfa1067ac30022d793bVariants of Banking Trojan
MD534a8dda75aea25d92cd66da53a718589Variants of Banking Trojan
MD588b808d8164e709df2ca99f73ead2e16Variants of Banking Trojan
MD5d3f845c84a2bd8e3589a6fbf395fea06Variants of Banking Trojan
MD528a0968163b6e6857471305aee5c17e9Variants of Banking Trojan
MD51285205ae5dd5fa5544b3855b11b989dVariants of Banking Trojan
MD5613563d7863b4f9f66590064b88164c8Variants of Banking Trojan
MD53dd43e69f8d71fcc2704eb73c1ea7dafVariants of Banking Trojan
C2 https[:]//panel-dark[.]com/w3af/img2.jpg 
C2 https[:]//panel-dark[.]com/w3af/img1.jpg 


*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/04/metamorfo-campaign-targeting-brazilian-users.html