Over the last few months, FireEye has tracked an in-the-wild campaign
that leverages compromised sites to spread fake updates. In some
cases, the payload was the NetSupport Manager remote access tool
(RAT). NetSupport Manager is a commercially available RAT that can be
used legitimately by system administrators for remotely accessing
client computers. However, malicious actors are abusing this
application by installing it to the victims’ systems without their
knowledge to gain unauthorized access to their machines. This blog
instances where the identified payload was NetSupport RAT.
The operator behind these campaigns uses compromised sites to spread
fake updates masquerading as Adobe Flash, Chrome, and FireFox updates.
When users navigate to the compromised website, the malicious
to the server. After receiving further commands from the server, it
and it is executed from %AppData% with the help of wscript.exe. Figure
1 shows the infection flow.
Figure 1: Infection Flow
Like other malicious scripts, the first layer has obfuscation that
builds and executes the second layer as a new function. The second
snapshot of the second layer.
Figure 2: Second Layer of Initial
method to make the analysis harder for reverse engineers. The author
uses the caller and callee function code to get the key
any obfuscated script, the analyst tries to de-obfuscate or beautify
line breaks and tabs to make the script code look better and easier to
analyze. The tools also try to rename the local variables and remove
unreferenced variables and code from the script, which helps to
analyze core code only.
But in this case, since the malware uses the caller and
callee function code to derive the key, if the analyst adds or
removes anything from the first or second layer script, the script
will not be able to retrieve the key and will terminate with an
exception. The code snippet in Figure 3 shows this trick.
Figure 3: Anti-Analysis Trick Implemented
This decrypted function contains code that initiates the network
connection. In the decoded function, the command and control (C2) URL
and a value named tid are hard-coded in the script and
protected with some encoded function.
During its first communication to the server, the malware sends the
tid value and the current date of the system in encoded format,
and waits for the response from the server. It decodes the server
response and executes the response as a function, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Initial Server Communication
executes as a function named step2.
Architecture, ComputerName, UserName, Processors, OS, Domain,
Manufacturer, Model, BIOS_Version, AntiSpywareProduct,
AntiVirusProduct, MACAddress, Keyboard, PointingDevice,
After sending the system information to the server, the response
from the server contains two parts: content2 and content3.
The script (step2 function) decodes both parts. The
decoded content3 part contains the function named as
step3, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Decrypting and Executing
The step3 function contains code that writes decoded
content2 into a %temp% directory as Update.js. Update.js
contains code to download and execute the final payload. The
step3 function also sends the resulting data, such as
runFileResult and _tempFilePath, to the server, as shown
in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Script to Drop and Execute Update.js
The Update.js file also contains multi-layer obfuscation. After
%AppData%, including a 7zip standalone executable (7za.exe),
password-protected archive (Loglist.rtf), and batch script (Upd.cmd).
We will talk more about these components later.
server. It sets the attribute’s execution policy to bypass and
window-style to hidden to hide itself from the end user.
Components of the Attack
Figure 7 shows the index of the malicious server where we have
observed the malware author updating the script content.
Figure 7: Index of Malicious Server
- 7za.exe: 7zip standalone
- LogList.rtf: Password-protected archive file
- Upd.cmd: Batch script to install the NetSupport Client
- Downloads.txt: List of IPs (possibly the infected systems)
- Get.php: Downloads LogList.rtf
This file is a batch script that extracts the archive file and
installs the remote control tool on the system. The script is
obfuscated with the variable substitution method. This file was
regularly updated by the malware during our analysis.
After de-obfuscating the script, we can see the batch commands in
the script (Figure 8).
Figure 8: De-Obfuscated Upd.cmd Script
The script performs the following tasks:
- Extract the archive using
the 7zip executable with the password mentioned in the script.
- After extraction, delete the downloaded archive file
- Disable Windows Error Reporting and App
- Add the remote control client executable to
the firewall’s allowed program list.
- Run remote control
- Add Run registry entry with the name
“ManifestStore” or downloads shortcut file to Startup folder.
- Hide the files using attributes.
- Delete all the
artifacts (7zip executable, script, archive file).
Note: While analyzing the script, we found some typos in the
script (Figure 9). Yes, malware authors make mistakes too. This script
might be in beta phase. In the later version of script, the author has
removed these typos.
Figure 9: Registry Entry Bloopers
As mentioned, the script contains code to remove the artifacts used
in the attack from the victim’s system. While monitoring the server,
we also observed some change in the script related to this code, as
shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Artifact Cleaning Commands
The highlighted command in one of the variants indicates that it
might drop or use this file in the attack. The file could be a decoy document.
During our analysis, we observed two variants of this attack with
different persistence mechanisms.
In the first variant, the malware author uses a RUN registry entry
to remain persistent in the system.
In the second variant, the malware author uses the shortcut file
(named desktop.ini.lnk), which is hosted on the server. It
downloads the shortcut file and places it into the Startup folder, as
shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Downloading Shortcut File
The target command for the shortcut file points to the remote
application “client32.exe,” which was dropped in %AppData%, to start
the application on startup.
Although the file extension is .rtf, the file is actually a 7zipped
archive. This archive file is password-protected and contains the
NetSupport Manager RAT. The script upd.cmd contains the password to
extract the archive.
The major features provided by the NetSupport tool include:
- Remote desktop
- File transfer
- Remote inventory and system
- Launching applications in client’s
This file contains a list of IP addresses, which could be
compromised systems. It has IPs along with User-agent. The IP
addresses in the file belong to various regions, mostly the U.S.,
Germany, and the Netherlands.
RATs are widely used for legitimate purposes, often by system
administrators. However, since they are legitimate applications and
readily available, malware authors can easily abuse them and sometimes
can avoid user suspicion as well.
The FireEye HX Endpoint platform successfully detects this attack at
the initial phase of the attack cycle.
Thanks to my colleagues Dileep Kumar Jallepalli, Rakesh Sharma and
Kimberly Goody for their help in the analysis.
Indicators of Compromise
Firewall program entry allowing the following application
Running process named “client32.exe” from the path “%AppData%\ManifestStore\client32.exe”
obfuscation techniques described in the blog:
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research Blog authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/04/fake-software-update-abuses-netsupport-remote-access-tool.html