SANNY Malware Delivery Method Updated in Recently Observed Attacks

Introduction

In the third week of March 2018, through FireEye’s Dynamic Threat
Intelligence, FireEye discovered malicious macro-based Microsoft Word
documents distributing SANNY malware to multiple governments
worldwide. Each malicious document lure was crafted in regard to
relevant regional geopolitical issues. FireEye has tracked the SANNY
malware family since 2012 and believes that it is unique to a group
focused on Korean Peninsula issues. This group has consistently
targeted diplomatic entities worldwide, primarily using lure documents
written in English and Russian.

As part of these recently observed attacks, the threat actor has
made significant changes to their usual malware delivery method. The
attack is now carried out in multiple stages, with each stage being
downloaded from the attacker’s server. Command line evasion
techniques, the capability to infect systems running Windows 10, and
use of recent User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques have also
been added.

Document Details

The following two documents, detailed below, have been observed in
the latest round of attacks:

MD5 hash: c538b2b2628bba25d68ad601e00ad150
SHA256
hash:

b0f30741a2449f4d8d5ffe4b029a6d3959775818bf2e85bab7fea29bd5acafa4
Original Filename: РГНФ 2018-2019.doc

The document shown in Figure 1 discusses Eurasian geopolitics as
they relate to China, as well as Russia’s security.



Figure 1: Sample document written in Russian

MD5 hash: 7b0f14d8cd370625aeb8a6af66af28ac
SHA256
hash:

e29fad201feba8bd9385893d3c3db42bba094483a51d17e0217ceb7d3a7c08f1
Original Filename: Copy of communication from Security
Council Committee (1718).doc

The document shown in Figure 2 discusses sanctions on humanitarian
operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).



Figure 2: Sample document written in English

Macro Analysis

In both documents, an embedded macro stores the malicious command
line to be executed in the TextBox property (TextBox1.Text) of the
document. This TextBox property is first accessed by the macro to
execute the command on the system and is then overwritten to delete
evidence of the command line.

Stage 1: BAT File Download

In Stage 1, the macro leverages the legitimate Microsoft Windows
certutil.exe utility to download an encoded Windows Batch (BAT) file
from the following URL: http://more.1apps[.]com/1.txt. The macro then
decodes the encoded file and drops it in the %temp% directory with the
name: 1.bat.

There were a few interesting observations in the command line:

  1. The macro copies the
    Microsoft Windows certutil.exe utility to the %temp% directory with
    the name: ct.exe. One of the reasons for this is to evade detection
    by security products. Recently, FireEye has observed other threat
    actors using certutil.exe for malicious purposes. By renaming
    “certutil.exe” before execution, the malware authors are attempting
    to evade simple file-name based heuristic detections.
  2. The
    malicious BAT file is stored as the contents of a fake PEM encoded
    SSL certificate (with the BEGIN and END markers) on the Stage 1 URL,
    as shown in Figure 3.  The “certutil.exe” utility is then leveraged
    to both strip the BEGIN/END markers and decode the Base64 contents
    of the file. FireEye has not previously observed the malware authors
    use this technique in past campaigns.



Figure 3: Malicious BAT file stored as an
encoded file to appear as an SSL certificate

BAT File Analysis

Once decoded and executed, the BAT file from Stage 1 will download
an encoded CAB file from the base URL: hxxp://more.1apps[.]com/. The
exact file name downloaded is based on the architecture of the
operating system.

  • For a 32-bit operating
    system: hxxp://more.1apps[.]com/2.txt
  • For a 64-bit
    operating system: hxxp://more.1apps[.]com/3.txt

Similarly, based on Windows operating system version and
architecture, the CAB file is installed using different techniques.
For Windows 10, the BAT file uses rundll32 to invoke the appropriate
function from update.dll (component inside setup.cab).

  • For a 32-bit operating
    system: rundll32 update.dll _EntryPoint@16
  • For a 64-bit
    operating system: rundll32 update.dll EntryPoint

For other versions of Windows, the CAB file is extracted using the
legitimate Windows Update Standalone Installer (wusa.exe) directly
into the system directory:

The BAT file also checks for the presence of Kaspersky Lab Antivirus
software on the machine. If found, CAB installation is changed
accordingly in an attempt to bypass detection:

Stage 2: CAB File Analysis

As described in the previous section, the BAT file will download the
CAB file based on the architecture of the underlying operating system.
The rest of the malicious activities are performed by the downloaded
CAB file.

The CAB file contains the following components:

  • install.bat – BAT file
    used to deploy and execute the components.
  • ipnet.dll – Main
    component that we refer to as SANNY malware.
  • ipnet.ini –
    Config file used by SANNY malware.
  • NTWDBLIB.dll – Performs
    UAC bypass on Windows 7 (32-bit and 64-bit).
  • update.dll –
    Performs UAC bypass on Windows 10.

install.bat will perform the following essential activities:

  1. Checks the current
    execution directory of the BAT file. If it is not the Windows system
    directory, then it will first copy the necessary components
    (ipnet.dll and ipnet.ini) to the Windows system directory before
    continuing execution:

  2. Hijacks a legitimate Windows system service,
    COMSysApp (COM+ System Application) by first stopping this service,
    and then modifying the appropriate Windows service registry keys to
    ensure that the malicious ipnet.dll will be loaded when the
    COMSysApp service is started:

  3. After the hijacked COMSysApp service is
    started, it will delete all remaining components of the CAB
    file:

ipnet.dll is the main component inside the CAB file that is used for
performing malicious activities. This DLL exports the following two functions:

  1. ServiceMain – Invoked
    when the hijacked system service, COMSysApp, is started.
  2. Post – Used to perform data exfiltration to the command and
    control (C2) server using FTP protocol.

The ServiceMain function first performs a check to see if it is
being run in the context of svchost.exe or rundll32.exe. If it is
being run in the context of svchost.exe, then it will first start the
system service before proceeding with the malicious activities. If it
is being run in the context of rundll32.exe, then it performs the
following activities:

  1. Deletes the module
    NTWDBLIB.DLL from the disk using the following command:

    cmd /c taskkill /im cliconfg.exe /f /t && del /f /q
    NTWDBLIB.DLL

  2. Sets the code page on the system
    to 65001, which corresponds to UTF-8:

    cmd /c REG ADD
    HKCU\Console /v CodePage /t REG_DWORD /d 65001 /f

Command and Control (C2) Communication

SANNY malware uses the FTP protocol as the C2 communication channel.

FTP Config File

The FTP configuration information used by SANNY malware is encoded
and stored inside ipnet.ini.

This file is Base64 encoded using the following custom character
set: SbVIn=BU/dqNP2kWw0oCrm9xaJ3tZX6OpFc7Asi4lvuhf-TjMLRQ5GKeEHYgD1yz8

Upon decoding the file, the following credentials can be recovered:

  • FTP Server:
    ftp.capnix[.]com
  • Username: cnix_21072852
  • Password:
    vlasimir2017

It then continues to perform the connection to the FTP server
decoded from the aforementioned config file, and sets the current
directory on the FTP server as “htdocs” using the
FtpSetCurrentDirectoryW function.

System Information Collection

For reconnaissance purposes, SANNY malware executes commands on the
system to collect information, which is sent to the C2 server.

System information is gathered from the machine using the following command:

The list of running tasks on the system is gathered by executing the
following command:

C2 Commands

After successful connection to the FTP server decoded from the
configuration file, the malware searches for a file containing the
substring “to everyone” in the “htdocs” directory. This file will
contain C2 commands to be executed by the malware.

Upon discovery of the file with the “to everyone” substring, the
malware will download the file and then performs actions based on the
following command names:

  • chip command: This
    command deletes the existing ipnet.ini configuration file from the
    file system and creates a new ipnet.ini file with a specified
    configuration string. The chip commands allows the attacker to
    migrate malware to a new FTP C2 server. The command has the
    following syntax: 

  • pull command: This command is used for the
    purpose of data exfiltration. It has the ability to upload an
    arbitrary file from the local filesystem to the attacker’s FTP
    server. The command has the following syntax:

The uploaded file is compressed and
encrypted using the routine described later in the Compression and
Encoding Data section.

  • put command: This command
    is used to copy an existing file on the system to a new location and
    delete the file from the original location. The command has the
    following syntax:

  • default command: If the
    command begins with the substring “cmd /c”, but it is not followed
    by either of the previous commands (chip, pull, and put), then it
    directly executes the command on the machine using WinExec.
  • /user command: This
    command will execute a command on the system as the logged in user.
    The command duplicates the access token of “explorer.exe” and spawns
    a process using the following steps:

    1. Enumerates the running processes on the system to search for
      the explorer.exe process and obtain the process ID of
      explorer.exe.
    2. Obtains the access token for the
      explorer.exe process with the access flags set to
      0x000F01FF.
    3. Starts the application (defined in the C2
      command) on the system by calling the CreateProcessAsUser
      function and using the access token obtained in Step 2.

C2 Command

Purpose

chip

Update the FTP server config file

pull

Upload a file from the machine

put

Copy an existing file to a new destination

/user

Create a new process with explorer.exe access
token

default command

Execute a program on the machine
using WinExec()

Compression and Encoding Data

SANNY malware uses an interesting mechanism for compressing the
contents of data collected from the system and encoding it before
exfiltration. Instead of using an archiving utility, the malware
leverages Shell.Application COM object and calls the CopyHere method
of the IShellDispatch interface to perform compression as follows:

  1. Creates an empty ZIP file
    with the name: temp.zip in the %temp% directory.
  2. Writes the
    first 16 bytes of the PK header to the ZIP file.
  3. Calls the
    CopyHere method of IShellDispatch interface to compress the
    collected data and write to temp.zip.
  4. Reads the contents of
    temp.zip to memory.
  5. Deletes temp.zip from the disk.
  6. Creates an empty file, post.txt, in the %temp% directory.
  7. The temp.zip file contents are Base64 encoded (using the same
    custom character set mentioned in the previous FTP Config File
    section) and written to the file: %temp%\post.txt.
  8. Calls
    the FtpPutFileW function to write the contents of post.txt to the
    remote file with the format: “from
    <computer_name_timestamp>.txt”

Execution on Windows 7 and User Account Control (UAC) Bypass

NTWDBLIB.dll – This component from the CAB file will be extracted to
the %windir%\system32 directory. After this, the cliconfg command is
executed by the BAT file.

The purpose of this DLL module is to launch the install.bat file.
The file cliconfg.exe is a legitimate Windows binary (SQL Client
Configuration Utility), loads the library NTWDBLIB.dll upon execution.
Placing a malicious copy of NTWDBLIB.dll in the same directory as
cliconfg.exe is a technique known as DLL side-loading, and results in
a UAC bypass.

Execution on Windows 10 and UAC Bypass

Update.dll – This component from the CAB file is used to perform UAC
bypass on Windows 10. As described in the BAT File Analysis section,
if the underlying operating system is Windows 10, then it uses
update.dll to begin the execution of code instead of invoking the
install.bat file directly.

The main actions performed by update.dll are as follows:

  1. Executes the following
    commands to setup the Windows registry for UAC bypass:

  2. Leverages a UAC
    bypass technique
    that uses the legitimate Windows binary,
    fodhelper.exe, to perform the UAC bypass on Windows 10 so that the
    install.bat file is executed with elevated privileges:

  3. Creates an additional BAT file, kill.bat, in
    the current directory to delete evidence of the UAC bypass. The BAT
    file kills the current process and deletes the components update.dll
    and kill.bat from the file system:

Conclusion

This activity shows us that the threat actors using SANNY malware
are evolving their malware delivery methods, notably by incorporating
UAC bypasses and endpoint evasion techniques. By using a multi-stage
attack with a modular architecture, the malware authors increase the
difficulty of reverse engineering and potentially evade security solutions.

Users can protect themselves from such attacks by disabling Office
macros in their settings and practicing vigilance when enabling macros
(especially when prompted) in documents, even if such documents are
from seemingly trusted sources.

Indicators of Compromise

SHA256 Hash

Original Filename

b0f30741a2449f4d8d5ffe4b029a6d3959775818bf2e85bab7fea29bd5acafa4

РГНФ 2018-2019.doc

e29fad201feba8bd9385893d3c3db42bba094483a51d17e0217ceb7d3a7c08f1

 

Copy of
communication from Security Council Committee (1718).doc

eb394523df31fc83aefa402f8015c4a46f534c0a1f224151c47e80513ceea46f

1.bat

a2e897c03f313a097dc0f3c5245071fbaeee316cfb3f07785932605046697170

Setup.cab (64-bit)

a3b2c4746f471b4eabc3d91e2d0547c6f3e7a10a92ce119d92fa70a6d7d3a113

Setup.cab (32-bit)



*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research Blog authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html