Significant FormBook Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U.S. and South Korea

We observed several high-volume FormBook malware distribution
campaigns primarily taking aim at Aerospace, Defense Contractor, and
Manufacturing sectors within the U.S. and South Korea during the past
few months. The attackers involved in these email campaigns leveraged
a variety of distribution mechanisms to deliver the information
stealing FormBook malware, including:

  • PDFs with download links
  • DOC and XLS files with
    malicious macros
  • Archive files (ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISOs)
    containing EXE payloads

The PDF and DOC/XLS campaigns primarily impacted the United States
and the Archive campaigns largely impacted the Unites States and South Korea.

FormBook Overview

FormBook is a data stealer and form grabber that has been advertised
in various hacking forums since early 2016. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show
the online advertisement for the malware.



Figure 1: FormBook advertisement



Figure 2: FormBook underground pricing

The malware injects itself into various processes and installs
function hooks to log keystrokes, steal clipboard contents, and
extract data from HTTP sessions. The malware can also execute commands
from a command and control (C2) server. The commands include
instructing the malware to download and execute files, start
processes, shutdown and reboot the system, and steal cookies and local passwords.

One of the malware’s most interesting features is that it reads
Windows’ ntdll.dll module from disk into memory, and calls its
exported functions directly, rendering user-mode hooking and API
monitoring mechanisms ineffective. The malware author calls this
technique "Lagos Island method" (allegedly originating from
a userland rootkit with this name). 

It also features a persistence method that randomly changes the
path, filename, file extension, and the registry key used for persistence. 

The malware author does not sell the builder, but only sells the
panel, and then generates the executable files as a service.

Capabilities

FormBook is a data stealer, but not a full-fledged banker (banking
malware). It does not currently have any extensions or plug-ins. Its
capabilities include: 

  • Key logging

  • Clipboard monitoring

  • Grabbing
    HTTP/HTTPS/SPDY/HTTP2 forms and network requests 
  • Grabbing
    passwords from browsers and email clients 
  • Screenshots 

FormBook can receive the following remote commands from the C2 server: 

  • Update bot on host system
  • Download and execute
    file
  • Remove bot from host system
  • Launch a command
    via ShellExecute
  • Clear browser cookies
  • Reboot
    system
  • Shutdown system
  • Collect passwords and create
    a screenshot
  • Download and unpack ZIP archive

Infrastructure

The C2 domains typically leverage less widespread, newer generic
top-level domains (gTLDs) such as .site, .website, .tech, .online, and .info.

The C2 domains used for this recently observed FormBook activity
have been registered using the WhoisGuard privacy protection service.
The server infrastructure is hosted on BlazingFast.io, a Ukrainian
hosting provider. Each server typically has multiple FormBook panel
installation locations, which could be indicative of an affiliate model.

Behavior Details

File Characteristics

Our analysis in this blog post is based on the following
representative sample:

Filename

MD5 Hash

Size (bytes)

Compile Time

Unavailable

CE84640C3228925CC4815116DDE968CB

747,652

2012-06-09
13:19:49Z

Table 1: FormBook sample details

Packer

The malware is a self-extracting RAR file that starts an AutoIt
loader. The AutoIt loader compiles and runs an AutoIt script. The
script decrypts the FormBook payload file, loads it into memory, and
then executes it.

Installation

The FormBook malware copies itself to a new location. The malware
first chooses one of the following strings to use as a prefix for its
installed filename:

ms, win, gdi, mfc, vga, igfx, user, help, config, update, regsvc,
chkdsk, systray, audiodg, certmgr, autochk, taskhost, colorcpl,
services, IconCache, ThumbCache, Cookies

It then generates two to five random characters and appends those to
the chosen string above 

followed by one of the following file extensions:

  • .exe, .com, .scr, .pif, .cmd, .bat

If the malware is running with elevated privileges, it copies itself
to one of the following directories:

  • %ProgramFiles% 
  • %CommonProgramFiles%

If running with normal privileges, it copies itself to one of the
following directories:

  • %USERPROFILE%
  • %APPDATA%
  • %TEMP%

Persistence

The malware uses the same aforementioned string list with a random
string to create a prefix, appends one to five random characters, and
uses this value as the registry value name.

The malware configures persistence to one of the following two
locations depending on its privileges:

  • (HKCU|HKLM)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
  • (HKCU|HKLM)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run

Startup

The malware creates two 16-byte mutexes. The first mutex is the
client identifier (e.g., 8-3503835SZBFHHZ). The second mutex value is
derived from the C2 information and the username (e.g., LL9PSC56RW7Bx3A5). 

The malware then iterates over a process listing and calculates a
checksum value of process names (rather than checking the name itself)
to figure out which process to inject. The malware may inject itself
into browser processes and explorer.exe. Depending on the target
process, the malware installs different function hooks (see
the Function Hooks section for further detail).

Anti-Analysis

The malware uses several techniques to complicate malware analysis: 

  • Timing checks using the RDTSC instruction
  • Calls
    NtQueryInformationProcess with InfoClass=7 (ProcessDebugPort)
  • Sample path and filename checks (sample filename must be shorter
    than 32 characters)
  • Hash-based module blacklist
  • Hash-based process blacklist
  • Hash-based username
    blacklist
  • Before communicating, it checks whether the C2
    server is present in the hosts file

The results of these tests are then placed into a 16-byte array, and
a SHA1 hash is calculated on the array, which will be later used as
the decryption key for subsequent strings (e.g. DLL names to load).
Failed checks may go unnoticed until the sample tries to load the
supporting DLLs
(kernel32.dll and advapi32.dll).

The correct 16-byte array holding the result of the checks is: 

  • 00 00 01 01 00 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 

Having a SHA1 value of:

  • 5b85aaa14f74e7e8adb93b040b0914a10b8b19b2 

After completing all anti-analysis checks, the sample manually maps
ntdll.dll from disk into memory and uses its exported functions
directly in the code. All API functions will have a small stub
function in the code that looks up the address of the API in the
mapped ntdll.dll using the CRC32 checksum of the API name, and sets up
the parameters on the stack. 

This will be followed by a direct register call to the mapped
ntdll.dll module. This makes regular debugger breakpoints on APIs
inoperable, as execution will never go through the system mapped ntdll.dll.

Process Injection

The sample loops through all the running processes to find
explorer.exe by the CRC32 checksum of its process name. It then
injects into explorer.exe using the following API calls (avoiding more
commonly identifiable techniques such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread):

  • NtMapViewOfSection
  • NtSetContextThread
  • NtQueueUserAPC


The injected code in the hijacked instance of explorer.exe randomly
selects and launches (as a suspended process) a built-in Windows
executable from the following list: 

  • svchost.exe, msiexec.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, wlanext.exe,
    msg.exe, lsm.exe, dwm.exe, help.exe, chkdsk.exe, cmmon32.exe,
    nbtstat.exe, spoolsv.exe, rdpclip.exe, control.exe, taskhost.exe,
    rundll32.exe, systray.exe, audiodg.exe, wininit.exe, services.exe,
    autochk.exe, autoconv.exe, autofmt.exe, cmstp.exe, colorcpl.exe,
    cscript.exe, explorer.exe, WWAHost.exe, ipconfig.exe, msdt.exe,
    mstsc.exe, NAPSTAT.EXE, netsh.exe, NETSTAT.EXE, raserver.exe,
    wscript.exe, wuapp.exe, cmd.exe 

The original process reads the randomly selected executable from the
memory of explorer.exe and migrates into this new process via
NtMapViewOfSection, NtSetContextThread, and NtQueueUserAPC. 


The new process then deletes the original sample and sets up
persistence (see the Persistence section for more detail). It
then goes into a loop that constantly enumerates running processes and
looks for targets based on the CRC32 checksum of the process name. 

Targeted process names include, but are not limited to: 


  • iexplore.exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe, MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe,
    explorer.exe, opera.exe, safari.exe, torch.exe, maxthon.exe,
    seamonkey.exe, avant.exe, deepnet.exe, k-meleon.exe, citrio.exe,
    coolnovo.exe, coowon.exe, cyberfox.exe, dooble.exe, vivaldi.exe,
    iridium.exe, epic.exe, midori.exe, mustang.exe,
    orbitum.exe,
palemoon.exe, qupzilla.exe, sleipnir.exe,
    superbird.exe, outlook.exe, thunderbird.exe, totalcmd.exe

After injecting into any of the target processes, it sets up
user-mode API hooks based on the process. 

The malware installs different function hooks depending on the
process. The primary purpose of these function hooks is to log
keystrokes, steal clipboard data, and extract authentication
information from browser HTTP sessions. The malware stores data in
local password log files. The directory name is derived from the C2
information and the username (the same as the second mutex created above: LL9PSC56RW7Bx3A5). 

However, only eight bytes from this value are used as the directory
name (e.g., LL9PSC56). Next, the first three characters from the
derived directory name are used as a prefix for the log file followed
by the string log. Following this prefix are names corresponding to
the type of log file. For example, for Internet Explorer passwords,
the following log file would be created:

  • %APPDATA%\LL9PSC56\LL9logri.ini.

The following are the password log filenames without the prefix:

  • (no name): Keylog data
  • rg.ini: Chrome passwords
  • rf.ini: Firefox passwords
  • rt.ini: Thunderbird
    passwords
  • ri.ini: Internet Explorer passwords
  • rc.ini: Outlook passwords
  • rv.ini: Windows Vault
    passwords
  • ro.ini: Opera passwords

One additional file that does not use the .INI file extension is a
screenshot file:

  • im.jpeg

Function Hooks

Keylog/clipboard monitoring:

  • GetMessageA
  • GetMessageW
  • PeekMessageA
  • PeekMessageW
  • SendMessageA
  • SendMessageW

Browser hooks:

  • PR_Write
  • HttpSendRequestA
  • HttpSendRequestW
  • InternetQueryOptionW
  • EncryptMessage
  • WSASend

The browser hooks look for certain strings in the content of HTTP
requests and, if a match is found, information about the request is
extracted. The targeted strings are:

  • pass
  • token
  • email
  • login
  • signin
  • account
  • persistent

Network Communications

The malware communicates with the following C2 server using HTTP requests: 

  • www[.]clicks-track[.]info/list/hx28/

Beacon

As seen in Figure 3, FormBook sends a beacon request (controlled by
a timer/counter) using HTTP GET with an "id" parameter in
the URL.



Figure 3: FormBook beacon

The decoded "id" parameter is as follows:

  • FBNG:134C0ABB 2.9:Windows 7 Professional x86:VXNlcg==

Where:

  • "FBNG" – magic bytes

  • "134C0ABB"
    – the CRC32 checksum of the user’s SID 
  • "2.9" –
    the bot version

  • "Windows 7 Professional" –
    operating system version
  • "x86" – operating system
    architecture

  • "VXNlcg==" – the Base64 encoded
    username (i.e., "User" in this case)

Communication Encryption

The malware sends HTTP requests using hard-coded HTTP header values.
The HTTP headers shown in Figure 4 are hardcoded.



Figure 4: Hard-coded HTTP header values

Messages to the C2 server are sent RC4 encrypted and Base64 encoded.
The malware uses a slightly altered Base64 alphabet, and also uses the
character "." instead of "=" as the pad character:

  • Standard Alphabet: 
    • ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/
  • Modified Alphabet: 
    • ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_

The RC4 key is created using an implementation of the SHA1 hashing
algorithm with the C2 URL. The standard SHA1 algorithm reverses the
DWORD endianness at the end of the algorithm. This implementation does
not, which results in a reverse endian DWORDs. For example, the SHA1
hash for the aforementioned URL
is "9b198a3cfa6ff461cc40b754c90740a81559b9ae," but when
reordering the DWORDs, it produces the correct RC4
key: 3c8a199b61f46ffa54b740cca84007c9aeb95915. The first DWORD
"9b198a3c" becomes "3c8a199b."

Figure 5 shows an example HTTP POST request.



Figure 5: Example HTTP POST request

In this example, the decoded result is: 

  • Clipboard\r\n\r\nBlank Page – Windows Internet
    Explorer\r\n\r\ncEXN{3wutV,

Accepted Commands

When a command is sent by the C2 server, the HTTP response body has
the format shown in Figure 6.



Figure 6: FormBook C2 server response
with command

The data begins with the magic bytes "FBNG," and a
one-byte command code from hex bytes 31 to 39 (i.e., from
"1" to "9") in clear text. This is then followed
by the RC4-encoded command data (where the RC4 key is the same as the
one used for the request). In the decrypted data, another occurrence
of the magic FBNG bytes indicates the end of the command data. 

The malware accepts the commands shown in Table 2.

Command

Parameters
(after decryption)

Purpose

‘1’ (0x31) 

<pe_file_data>FBNG

Download and execute file from
%TEMP% directory 

‘2’ (0x32) 

<pe_file_data>FBNG

Update bot on host machine 

‘3’ (0x33) 

FBNG

Remove bot from host machine 

‘4’ (0x34) 

<command_string>FBNG

Launch a command via
ShellExecute 

‘5’ (0x35) 

FBNG

Clear browser cookies 

‘6’ (0x36) 

FBNG 

Reboot operating system 

‘7’ (0x37) 

FBNG

Shutdown operating system 

‘8’ (0x38) 

FBNG

Collect email/browser passwords and create a
screenshot

‘9’ (0x39) 

<zip_file_data>FBNG

Download and unpack ZIP archive into
%TEMP% directory

Table 2: FormBook accepted commands

Distribution Campaigns

FireEye researchers observed FormBook distributed via email
campaigns using a variety of different attachments:

  • PDFs with links to the "tny.im" URL-shortening
    service, which then redirected to a staging server that contained
    FormBook executable payloads
  • DOC and XLS attachments that
    contained malicious macros that, when enabled, initiated the
    download of FormBook payloads
  • ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISO
    attachments that contained FormBook executable files

The PDF Campaigns

The PDF campaigns leveraged FedEx and DHL shipping/package delivery
themes (Figure 7 and Figure 8), as well as a document-sharing theme.
The PDFs distributed did not contain malicious code, just a link to
download the FormBook payload.

The staging servers (shown in Table 3) appeared to be compromised websites.



Figure 7: Example PDF campaign email lure
with attachment



Figure 8: Example PDF campaign attachment

Sample Subject Lines

Shorted URLs

Staging Servers

<Recipient’s_Name> – You have a
parcel awaiting pick up

<Recipient’s_Name>
– I shared a file with you

tny[.]im/9TK

tny[.]im/9Uw

tny[.]im/9G1

tny[.]im/9Q6

tny[.]im/9H1

tny[.]im/9R7

tny[.]im/9Tc

tny[.]im/9RM

tny[.]im/9G0

tny[.]im/9Oq

tny[.]im/9Oh

maxsutton[.]co[.]uk

solderie[.]dream3w[.]com

lifekeeper[.]com[.]au

brinematriscript[.]com

jaimagroup[.]com

Table 3: Observed email subjects and download
URLs for PDF campaign

Based on data from the tny.im-shortened links, there were a total of
716 hits across 36 countries. As seen in Figure 9, most of the
malicious activity from the PDF campaign impacted the United States.



Figure 9: Geolocation statistics from
tny.im URL shortener

The DOC/XLS Campaigns

The email campaigns distributing DOC and XLS files relied on the use
of malicious macros to download the executable payload. When the
macros are enabled, the download URL retrieves an executable file with
a PDF extension. Table 4 shows observed email subjects and download
URLs used in these campaigns.

Sample Subject Lines

Staging Server

URL
Paths

61_Invoice_6654

ACS PO 1528

NEW
ORDER – PO-074

NEW ORDER – PO#074

REQUEST FOR
QUOTATION/CONTRACT OVERHAUL MV OCEAN MANTA//SUPPLY
P-3PROPELLER

URGENT PURCHASE ORDER 1800027695

sdvernoms[.]ml

/oc/runpie.pdf

/sem/essen.pdf

/drops/microcore.pdf

/damp/10939453.pdf

/sem/essentials.exe

/oc/runpie.pdf

/sem/ampama.pdf

/js/21509671Packed.pdf

/sem/essen.pdf

Table 4: Observed email subjects and download
URLs for the DOC/XLS campaign

FireEye detection technologies observed this malicious activity
between Aug. 11 and Aug. 22, 2017 (Figure 10). Much of the activity
was observed in the United States (Figure 11), and the most targeted
industry vertical was Aerospace/Defense Contractors (Figure 12).



Figure 10: DOC/XLS campaign malicious
activity by date



Figure 11: Top 10 countries affected by
the DOC/XLS campaign



Figure 12: Top 10 industry verticals
affected by the DOC/XLS campaign

The Archive Campaign

The Archive campaign delivered a variety of archive formats,
including ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISO, and accounted for the highest
distribution volume. It leveraged a myriad of subject lines that were
characteristically business related and often regarding payment or
purchase orders:

Sample Subject Lines

HSBC MT103 PAYMENT CONFIRMATION Our Ref:
HBCCTKF8003445VTC

MT103 PAYMENT CONFIRMATION Our Ref:
BCCMKE806868TSC Counterparty:.

Fwd: INQUIRY RFQ-18
H0018

Fw: Remittance Confirmation

NEW ORDER FROM
COBRA INDUSTRIAL MACHINES IN SHARJAH

PO. NO.: 10701 –
Send Quotaion Pls

Re: bgcqatar project

Re:
August korea ORDER

Purchase Order #234579

purchase order for August017

FireEye detection technologies observed this campaign activity
between July 18 and Aug. 17, 2017 (Figure 13). Much of the activity
was observed in South Korea and the United States (Figure 14), with
the Manufacturing industry vertical being the most impacted (Figure 15).



Figure 13: Archive campaign malicious
activity by date



Figure 14: Top 10 countries affected by
the Archive campaign



Figure 15: Top 10 industry verticals
affected by the Archive campaign 

Conclusion

While FormBook is not unique in either its functionality or
distribution mechanisms, its relative ease of use, affordable pricing
structure, and open availability make FormBook an attractive option
for cyber criminals of varying skill levels. In the last few weeks,
FormBook was seen downloading other malware families such as NanoCore.
 The credentials and other data harvested by successful FormBook
infections could be used for additional cyber crime activities
including, but not limited to: identity theft, continued phishing
operations, bank fraud and extortion.

*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research Blog authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/10/formbook-malware-distribution-campaigns.html