The following blog discusses a couple of common techniques that
malware uses to obscure its access to the Windows API. In both forms
examined, analysts must calculate the API start address and resolve
the symbol from the runtime process in order to determine functionality.
After introducing the techniques, we present an open source tool
we developed that can be used to resolve addresses from a process
running in a virtual machine by an IDA script. This gives us an
efficient way to quickly add readability back into the disassembly.
When performing an analysis, it is very common to see malware try to
obscure the API it uses. As a malware analyst, determining which API
is used is one of the first things we must resolve in order to
determine the capabilities of the code.
Two common obfuscations we are going to look at in this blog are
encoded function pointer tables and detours style hook stubs. In both
of these scenarios the entry point to the API is not directly visible
in the binary.
For an example of what we are talking about, consider the code in
Figure 1, which was taken from a memory dump of xdata crypto
ransomware sample C6A2FB56239614924E2AB3341B1FBBA5.
Figure 1: API obfuscation code from a crypto
In Figure 1, we see one numeric value being loaded into eax, XORed
against another, and then being called as a function pointer. These
numbers only make sense in the context of a running process. We can
calculate the final number from the values contained in the memory
dump, but we also need a way to know which API address it resolved to
in this particular running process. We also have to take into account
that DLLs can be rebased due to conflicts in preferred base address,
and systems with ASLR enabled.
Figure 2 shows one other place we can look to see where the values
were initially set.
Figure 2: Crypto malware setting obfuscated
function pointer from API hash
In this case, the initial value is loaded from an API hash lookup –
again not of immediate value. Here we have hit a crossroad, with
multiple paths we can take to resolve the problem. We can search for a
published hash list, extract the hasher and build our own database, or
figure out a way to dynamically resolve the decoded API address.
Before we choose which path to take, let us consider another sample.
Figure 3 shows code from Andromeda sample, 3C8B018C238AF045F70B38FC27D0D640.
Figure 3: API redirection code from an Andromeda sample
This code was found in a memory injection. Here we can see what
looks to be a detours style trampoline, where the first instruction
was stolen from the actual Windows API and placed in a small stub with
an immediate jump taken back to the original API + x bytes.
In this situation, the malware accesses all of the API through these
stubs and we have no clear resolution as to which stub points where.
From the disassembly we can also see that the stolen instructions are
of variable length.
In order to resolve where these functions go, we would have to:
- enumerate all of the stubs
- calculate how many bytes
are in the first instruction
- extract the jmp address
- subtract the stolen byte count to find the API entrypoint
- resolve the calculated address for this specific process
- rename the stub to a meaningful value
In this sample, looking for cross references on where the value is
set does not yield any results.
Here we have two manifestations of essentially the same problem. How
do we best resolve calculated API addresses and add this information
back into our IDA database?
One of the first techniques used was to calculate all of the final
addresses, write them to a binary file, inject the data into the
process, and examine the table in the debugger (Figure 4). Since the
debugger already has a API address look up table, this gives a crude
yet quick method to get the information we need.
Figure 4: ApiLogger from iDefense MAP injecting
a data file into a process and examining results in debugger
From here we can extract the resolved symbols and write a script to
integrate them into our IDB. This works, but it is bulky and involves
What we really want is to build our own symbol lookup table for a
process and create a streamlined way to access it from our scripts.
The first question is: How can we build our own lookup table of API
addresses to API names? To resolve this information, we need to follow
- enumerate all of the DLLs loaded into a process
each DLL, walk the export table and extract function name and
- calculate API entrypoint based on DLL base address and
- build a lookup table based on all of this
While this sounds like a lot of work, libraries are already
available that handle all of the heavy lifting. Figure 5 shows a
screenshot of a remote lookup
tool we developed for such occasions.
Figure 5: Open source remote lookup application
In order to maximize the benefits of this type of tool, the tool
must be efficient. What is the best way to interface with this data?
There are several factors to consider here, including how the data is
submitted, what input formats are accepted, and how well the tool can
be integrated with the flow of the analysis process.
The first consideration is how we interface with it. For maximum
flexibility, three methods were chosen. Lookups can be submitted:
- individually via textbox
- in bulk by file or
- over the network by a remote client
In terms of input formats, it accepts the following:
- hex memory address
- case insensitive API name
The tool output is in the form of a CSV list that includes address,
name, ordinal, and DLL.
With the base tool capabilities in place, we still need an efficient
streamlined way to use it during our analysis. The individual lookups
are nice for offhand queries and testing, but not in bulk. The bulk
file lookup is nice on occasion, but it still requires data
export/import to integrate results with your IDA database.
What is really needed is a way to run a script in IDA, calculate the
API address, and then resolve that address inline while running an IDA
script. This allows us to rename functions and pointers on the fly as
the script runs all in one shot. This is where the network client
capability comes in.
Again, there are many approaches to this. Here we chose to integrate
a network client into a beta of IDA Jscript (Figure 6). IDA Jscript is
an open source IDA scripting tool with IDE that includes syntax
highlighting, IntelliSense, function prototype tooltips, and debugger.
Figure 6: Open source IDA Jscript decoding and
resolving API addresses
In this example we see a script that decodes the xdata pointer
table, resolves the API address over the network, and then generates
an IDC script to rename the pointers in IDA.
After running this script and applying the results, the decompiler
output becomes plainly readable (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Decompiler output from the xdata
sample after symbol resolution
Going back to the Andromeda sample, the API information can be
restored with the brief idajs script shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: small idajs script to remotely resolve
and rename Andromeda API hook stubs
For IDAPython users, a python remote lookup client is also available.
It is common for malware to use techniques that mask the Windows API
being used. These techniques force malware analysts to have to extract
data from runtime data, calculate entry point addresses, and then
resolve their meaning within the context of a particular running process.
In previous techniques, several manual stages were involved that
were bulky and time intensive.
This blog introduces a small simple open source tool that can
integrate well into multiple IDA scripting languages. This combination
allows analysts streamlined access to the data required to quickly
bypass these types of obfuscations and continue on with their analysis.
We are happy to be able to open source the remote lookup application
so that others may benefit and adapt it to their own needs. Sample
network clients have been provided for Python, C#, D, and VB6.
Download a copy of
the tool today.
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research Blog authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/remote-symbol-resolution.html