On red team engagements, Mandiant consultants are often tasked with
identifying and obtaining access to critical Unix systems within our
client’s environments. The objectives may include obtaining payment
card data on point of sale terminals or accessing intellectual
property residing on Apple MacBooks.
Since Unix systems are typically not domain-joined, locating and
authenticating to them can be a challenge. In fact, current
methodologies often rely on luck. Typically, this can include:
- Examining live hosts not enumerable through Active
- Running netstat across all domain-joined
computers and looking for active connections over common
- Performing port scans for
services indicative of a Unix host.
- Searching Active
Directory for groups such as “Linux Admins” or “Mac Admins” and
identifying their members’ workstations and active sessions.
- Identifying non-AD LDAP instances and hosts associated with
In this blog, I address a new approach to finding Unix systems using
a small and purely PowerShell tool we created called SessionGopher.
Our thought process was simple: While most Unix systems are
off-domain, they are often accessed and managed by domain-joined
Windows systems. These Windows systems typically have remote access
tools installed on them that would suggest they communicate with Unix
systems, and these tools leave behind valuable artifacts that can help
consultants both discover and exploit the Unix systems. SessionGopher
is designed to identify these remote access tools and extract any
auxiliary information about the hosts to which they connect.
Where It Happens: The HKEY_USERS Hive
The HKEY_USERS hive is a Windows hive that contains persistent
information about users who have interactively logged on to the
system. For each user that authenticates to the system, Windows
creates a user subkey at location HKEY_USERS\<SID>, where
<SID> is that user’s security identifier. A privileged account,
such as a local or domain administrator, can access the contents of
every user subkey on the system under HKEY_USERS. A non-privileged
account on the same system can only access the user subkey associated
with his or her account.
Amazingly, within these user subkeys reside saved session
information for some of the remote access tools discussed earlier. If
a user creates a session in WinSCP, a file transfer client often used
to communicate with Unix systems, and then saves that session, the
entire saved session gets stored in the Registry under that user’s
HKEY_USERS\<User’s SID>\Software\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP
Using regedit, a graphical interface for the Windows Registry, we
can examine the contents of one of these sessions.
1: A WinSCP saved session in the HKEY_USERS hive
By default, the WinSCP password from Figure 1 is obfuscated by
several bitwise operations, not encrypted, unless the user explicitly
creates a master password to protect these registry values.
Similarly, PuTTY, an SSH client for Windows, stores its session
information as a separate subkey:
While PuTTY does not store passwords, it can store the hostnames to
which the client connects, as seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A PuTTY saved session in the
A plethora of remote access tools like these exist which store their
saved session information in the user’s HKEY_USERS subkey. Enumerating
the domain for systems with these artifacts provides an educated guess
as to where Unix systems may be hiding, potentially some credentials,
and the hosts that serve as jump boxes to those Unix systems.
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
In developing a post-exploitation tool, using WMI’s remote registry
querying functionality to extract these Registry-based saved session
artifacts made sense. Our tool SessionGopher
leverages WMI to query each SID found in the system’s HKEY_USERS hive
for the artifacts discussed earlier.
When a master password is not used, SessionGopher automatically
deobfuscates WinSCP saved session passwords, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: SessionGopher’s built-in WinSCP
On top of WinSCP and PuTTY, SessionGopher extracts saved RDP session
data from each user’s HKEY_USERS subkey. This expands SessionGopher’s
functionality from strictly finding Unix systems to also identifying
systems that may serve as jump boxes to different subnets. Figure 4
demonstrates SessionGopher returning saved RDP sessions on remote host
“WIN7-CLIENT01” when run against a set of domain computers.
Figure 4: SessionGopher discovering saved RDP
sessions when run across a domain
Expanding Analysis Methodology
Certain remote access tools such as SuperPuTTY and FileZilla store
saved sessions as files rather than in the Registry, so SessionGopher
also searches remote filesystems for those default file locations and
extracts saved passwords when stored. In -Thorough mode,
SessionGopher searches the entire remote filesystem for PuTTY private
key (.ppk), Remote Desktop Connection (.rdp), and RSA Soft Token
Currently, SessionGopher looks for artifacts from the following
- WinSCP saved sessions
PuTTY saved sessions
- FileZilla saved sessions
- PuTTY .ppk Files
- RSA .sdtid Files
Running SessionGopher across targeted systems on a domain with the
–o flag can nicely synthesize all session data into .csv files,
allowing the user to keep track of the source computer and user
account that led to the session’s discovery. Figure 5 shows
SessionGopher’s output folder when run with –o.
Figure 5: Folder of .csvs created by
SessionGopher’s –o flag
The fallacy in searching for Unix systems is that if they are not
domain-joined, interrogating domain systems for clues provides little
insight. As with any internal resource, Unix systems often require
management and communication with the corporate domain. The Registry
found on each of these domain-joined systems can serve as a trail of
breadcrumbs to the exact location of these Unix systems, and to any
segmented host of interest.
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research Blog authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/using_the_registryt.html