SCCM Software Metering
Reviewing forensic keyword searches can be confusing because it is
often difficult for an analyst to determine the source of the various
structures that contain string matches. One such structure belongs to
Microsoft’s System Center Configuration Manager’s (SCCM) software
metering history, which can record the path, name, size, associated
user name, last used time, launch count, and PE metadata of executed files.
Microsoft designed SCCM software metering to report application
usage for statistical analysis. Microsoft
TechNet provides a more complete overview of this feature. While
software metering data is meant to be reviewed by system
administrators on the SCCM server, client systems retain execution
history of recently used applications. For forensic investigators,
this execution history can be a goldmine for identifying both the
presence of deleted files and confirming that a file executed on a system.
Since SCCM generates this data, it will only be recorded if the
system is connected to a domain with an SCCM server and if software
metering is enabled. For these reasons, this artifact will likely only
exist on enterprise systems. Personal computers for home users or
criminals likely will not contain this artifact.
If enabled, Windows stores software metering execution logs as
CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records in the Windows Management Instrumentation
repository. The FireEye
Labs Advanced Reverse Engineering (FLARE) team released scripts that
parse this repository last year. Using FLARE’s python-cim
application, analysts can enumerate all allocated CCM_RecentlyUsedApps
instances from the root\ccm\SoftwareMeteringAgent namespace of a WMI repository.
To extract allocated CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records from a WMI
repository, python-cim requires the CIM repository files OBJECTS.DATA,
MAPPING*.MAP, and INDEX.BTR from the
C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository directory on a host. Figure 1
provides a command to extract allocated CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records
from CIM repository file located in WMI_Repo/ with python-cim.
Figure 1: Extracting allocated
CCM_REcentlyUsedApps records with python-cim
This may take a while to execute depending on the WMI repository’s
size. The output file will be tab delimited, which should parse easily
into your favorite spreadsheet application. This data allows for
keyword searching of files, paths and user accounts, as well as
timeline analysis. However, the most useful analysis method for this
data may be anomaly detection.
Figure 2 provides a transposed excerpt of python-cim’s
show_CCM_RecentlyUsedApps.py output. Note how legitimate files contain
PE metadata fields such as description, company name and product name
while the attacker did not configure that information in the malicious
file C:\Windows\Temp\evl.exe. Since legitimate files usually contain
this metadata, identifying null values is a great place to begin
analysis. Also note that some fields may not be recorded.
Figure 2: Extracted CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records
Even though python-cim can extract CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records, old
records may have been moved to inactive pages or even partially
overwritten. Due to an easily identifiable header and well defined
object structure, we can carve all allocated and unallocated
CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records from the OBJECTS.DATA file with CCM_RUA_Finder.py.
To understand how to carve CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records we must
understand the structure of the WMI CCM_RecentlyUsedApps class, as
each record is an instance of this class. All WMI class definitions
share a similar structure that at a high-level consists of a header
section, a property section and a data section. The header section
contains a unique GUID that allows us to quickly identify class
instances in the raw data, and the property and data sections contain
the values we are interested in carving. Most importantly, the
order of the values in the property and data sections is
static, meaning we can reliably carve fields using a combination of
offsets and regular expressions.
Figure 3 provides a sample hexdump of a CCM_RecentlyUsedApps class
instance from an OBJECTS.DATA file.
Figure 3: Hexdump of a complete
CCM_RecentlyUsedApps record from an OBJECTS.DATA file
Figure 4 provides the parsed contents of this CCM_RecentlyUsedApps
class instance and highlights values of interest.
Figure 4: Parsed contents of a
CCM_RecentlyUsedApps record with highlighted values of interest
A complete analysis of WMI class and class instance structures is
covered in the FLARE team’s “Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and
Forensics” white paper.
CCM_RUA_Finder.py can extract complete and even some partially
overwritten CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records from any OBJECTS.DAT file
that contains such CCM_RecentlyUsedApps class instances. The tab
delimited output will open nicely in your spreadsheet editor and
provide the same analysis capabilities stated earlier. Figure 5
provides a command to extract allocated, unallocated and partially
overwritten CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records from an OBJECTS.DATA file
Figure 5: Extracting allocated, unallocated, and
partially overwritten CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records with CCM_RUA_Finder.py
This command should complete quickly and will carve records to
produce output as seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Extracted full and carved
CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records from CCM_RUA_Finder.py
Just One Piece of the Puzzle
CCM_RecentlyUsedApps records are a great artifact to identify both
executed files and deleted attacker files when available. As with all
forensic artifacts, parsing these software metering agent log records
should be just one part of a complete and well-balanced investigation strategy.
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Threat Research Blog authored by Threat Research Blog. Read the original post at: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/12/do_you_see_what_icc.html