Threat Actor Leverages Windows Zero-day Exploit in Payment Card Data Attacks

In March 2016, a financially motivated threat actor launched several
tailored spear phishing campaigns primarily targeting the retail,
restaurant, and hospitality industries. The emails contained
variations of Microsoft
Word
documents with embedded
macros
that, when enabled,
downloaded and executed a malicious downloader that we refer to as PUNCHBUGGY.

PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader, existing in
both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, that can obtain additional code over
HTTPS. This downloader was used by the threat actor to interact with
compromised systems and move laterally across victim environments.

FireEye identified more than 100 organizations in North America that
fell victim to this campaign. FireEye investigated a number of these
breaches and observed that the threat actor had access to relatively
sophisticated tools including a previously unknown elevation of
privilege (EoP) exploit and a previously unnamed point of sale (POS)
memory scraping tool that we refer to as PUNCHTRACK. 

CVE-2016-0167 – Microsoft Windows Zero-Day Local Privilege Escalation

In some victim environments, the threat actor exploited a previously
unknown elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability in Microsoft
Windows to selectively gain SYSTEM privileges on a limited number of
compromised machines (Figure 1).

Figure 1. CVE-2016-0167 Local privilege
escalation exploit elevates to system

We coordinated with Microsoft, who patched CVE-2016-0167 on the
April 12, 2016, Patch Tuesday (MS16-039).
Working together, we were able to observe limited, targeted use of
this particular exploit dating back to March 8, 2016.

The Threat Actor

We attribute the use of this EoP to a financially motivated threat
actor. In the past year, not only have we observed this group using
similar infrastructure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),
but they are also the only group we have observed to date who uses the
downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS malware PUNCHTRACK. Designed to scrape
both Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data, PUNCHTRACK is loaded and
executed by a highly obfuscated launcher and is never saved to disk.

This actor has conducted operations on a large scale and at a rapid
pace, displaying a level of operational awareness and ability to adapt
their operations on the fly. These abilities, combined with targeted
usage of an EoP exploit and the reconnaissance required to
individually tailor phishing emails to victims, potentially speaks to
the threat actors’ operational maturity and sophistication.

Exploitation Details

Win32k!xxxMNDestroyHandler Use-After-Free

CVE-2016-0167 is a local elevation of privilege vulnerability in the
win32k Windows Graphics subsystem. An attacker who had already
achieved remote code execution (RCE) could exploit this vulnerability
to elevate privileges. In the attack from the wild, attackers first
achieved RCE with malicious macros in documents attached to spear
phishing emails. They then downloaded and ran a CVE-2016-0167 exploit
to run subsequent code as SYSTEM.

CVE-2016-0167 is patched as of April 12, 2016, meaning the
attacker’s EoP exploit will no longer function on fully updated
systems. Microsoft released an additional update (MS16-062)
on May 10, 2016, to further improve Windows against similar issues.

Vulnerability Setup

First, the exploit calls CreateWindowEx() to create a main window.
It sets the WNDCLASSEX.lpfnWndProc field to a function that we name
WndProc. It installs an application-defined hook (that we name
MessageHandler) and an event hook (that we name EventHandler) using
SetWindowsHookEx() and SetWinEventHook(), respectively.

Next, it creates a timer with IDEvent 0x5678 in SetTimer(). When the
timeout occurs, WndProc receives the WM_TIMER message and will invoke
TrackPopupMenuEx() to display a shortcut menu. EventHandler will
capture the EVENT_SYSTEM_MENUPOPUPSTART event from
xxxTrackPopupMenuEx()and post a message to the kernel. In handling the
message, the kernel eventually calls the vulnerable function
xxxMNDestroyHandler(), which calls the usermode callback
MessageHandler. MessageHandler then causes a use-after-free scenario
by calling DestroyWindow()

Heap Control

The exploit uses SetSysColors() to perform heap Feng Shui which
manipulates the layout of the heap by carefully making heap
allocations. In the following snippet, one of the important fields is
at address fffff900`c1aaac40, where fffff900`c06a0422 is a window
kernel object’s (tagWND) base address plus 0x22:

Memory Corruption

The USE operation occurs at HMAssignmentUnlock()+0x14 as shown below:

Since
RDX contains the base address of tagWND plus 0x22, this instruction
will add 0xffffffff to the win32k!tagWND.state field, changing its
value from 0x07004000 to 0x07003fff. 0x07004000 indicates that the
bServerSideWindowProc flag is unset. When the change occurs, it sets
the bServerSideWindowProc flag as shown below.

Code Execution

If a window is marked as server-side (bServerSideWindowPro is set),
the lpfnWndProc function pointer will be trusted by default and this
can be user-mode shellcode. The following backtrace shows the kernel
calling the exploit’s shellcode:

The shellcode then steals the System process token to elevate a
child cmd.exe process.

Mitigation

FireEye products and services identify this activity as
Exploit.doc.MVX, Malware.Binary.Doc, PUNCHBUGGY, Malware.Binary.exe,
and PUNCHTRACK within the user interfaces.

The latest Windows updates address CVE-2016-0167, and fully protect
systems from exploits targeting CVE-2016-0167.

In addition, effective mitigations exist to prevent social
engineering attacks that utilize Office macros. Individual users can
disable Office macros in their settings and enterprise administrators
can enforce a Group Policy to control macro execution for all Office
2016 users. More details about Office macro attacks and mitigations
are available here.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Elia Florio and the Secure@ staff of Microsoft, and
Dimiter Andonov, Erye Hernandez, Nick Richard, and Ryann Winters of
FireEye for their collaboration on this issue.

This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog post authored by Nick Harbour. Read the original post at: Threat Research Blog